N.B. Where Connor-LaJambe refers to Berkes, she is speaking of Fikret Berkes, a specialist on James Bay issues who is on faculty at the University of Manitoba. Unfortunately the copy that I have used to transcribe this article has no bibliography, so which of Berkes papers she is citing I would have to check. Some Facts about the [La Grande] James Bay [#1] Hydro Development by Dr. Helene Connor-Lajambe Phase 1 of the La Grande Complex, just by itself comprises three huge generating stations. The power available is 5,328 MW from LG2, 2,6500 MW from LG3, and 2,304 MW from LG4, a total of 10,282 MW. This , the first phase of the project, created four giant reservoirs (LG2, LG3, LG4, Caniapiscau, and Opinaca) which, being very shallow, cover 11,345 square km. Phase 2 of the La Grande Complex, under construction since 1987, is basically intended as an improvement to Phase 1; it will increase the water retention capabilities of the system while providing some additional equipment. The main impacts identified by ecologists (Berkes, 1989) can be summarized as follows: -flooding of vast territories and resulting loss of wilderness areas; -diversion of two rivers of which the Caniapiscau will flow into a different basin; -manipulation of La Grande water levels to maximize winter electrical production; -alteration of the water temperatures below LG2, where the water intake is subterranean; -erosion and collapse of river banks downstream from LG2; -interference with animal migration patterns (eg. the drowning of 10,000 caribou attempting to cross the Caniapiscau, in September 1984); -accumulation of mercury in reservoir fish, leading to a ban on commercial fishing; -decline in biological productivity of wetlands; In addition, the weight of the water in reservoirs, distributed as it is, could precipitate earthquake activity [this has been shown in the geological literature; northern Quebec has experienced substantially increased seismic activity since the dams were built]. Additionally impacts may well be discovered in the future (change of micro-climates, problems arising from the non-deforested reservoirs, etc.). And after all these changes have been made, and a new equilibrium is established [no sign of this happening in similar projects in northern Manitoba; scientists working on this say the system is essentially uncontrollably, and irretrivably out of balance and out of control. In other words, they expect no new equilibrium for decades, or even centuries (Newbury and McCullough, 1984] will it be an improvement? How will the ecological balance be affected by the new work of the Phase 2 and the other hydroelectric developments beingplanned? The northern environment is fragile [ecologists are debating this, but boreal areas may be less resilient due to their having less species than temperate ecosystems to the south] and slow to recover [no debate here]. How many shocks can it endure? ******** The cost of these immense labours is estimated by Hydro-Quebec, to exceed $15 billion, not including interest. At the end of 1988, Hydro-Quebec's debt was $21.6 billion, at an average interest rate of 10.92%. The $2,338 million paid in interest that year represents close to 45% of Hydro's total revenue from the sale of electricity. When the James Bay projet was launched in 1971, it was assumed that the demand for electricity would grow by more than 7% annually. In spite of the clear evidence to the contrary and solid opposition from the public, environmentalists, and native peoples, the project was allowed to proceed; there was no requirement to have public hearings. The cost of the project soon escalated due to the inexperience of the builders and their complete ignorance of the land. Estimated costs rose from 1 to 15 billion dollars between 1970 and 1982, placing Hydro-Quebec - and consequently the province - in a difficult financial situation. Quebec electricity rates have continued to climb. They have quadrupled over the past 15 years, growing from 1 to 4 cents per kilowatt hour. Although these rates are still among the cheapest in the world, it is only because of three fortuitous circumstances: an almost "free" god-given resource; the dirt-cheap production costs of Churchill Falls; and the many diverse advantages that Hydro Quebec receives as a publicly owned corporation. Suffering the consequences of its own overestimation of electrical demand, Hydro Quebec felt it had to reorganize itself to sell surplus electricity and to promote electrification in the province to the maximum extent possible. This single-minded mission, however, prevented Quebec from diversifying its energy supply and even interfered with the improvement of energy efficiency. The Quebec economy, far from opening up, has become more and more centred upon Hydro Quebec which, now grown to enormous size, continues to be subsidized by the government. Under such circumstances, Hydro inevitably imposes its will and its priorities on the province. Instead of trying to develop sound and appropriate industries which are ideally suited to meet the needs of Quebec citizens, and which could therefore ensure stable and permanent employment, the government has persistantly hustled to attract large capital-intensive companies, who happen to be large users of electricity (eg. the aluminum industry). Although such companies are often highly polluting, they need not submit to any environmental impact assessments. Hydro Quebec often undertakes new construction and signs new, very long term contracts, without once consulting the people of Quebec, its rightful owners. Yet all the risks are borne by the people, including that of having to build even more expensive dams in the future, after all the cheap power has been sold to others. Meanwhile, the number of electrical blackouts in Quebec has been breaking all records, revealing the extent to which Hydro has had to neglect routine maintainance and equipment replacement in order to cope with the consequences of the planning errors that led to Phase 1 of the James Bay project originally. Unfortunately, the decision-making process has not improved in the intervening years. There is evry reason to wonder whether the economy of Quebec might not slip - or be pushed - even further along the desparate path that has been followed by so many Third World countries.