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Re: IVs, summary of discussion

To: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
Subject: Re: IVs, summary of discussion
From: Steve Kent <kent@BBN.COM>
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 94 11:18:02 -0400
Cc: ipsec@ans.net
In-Reply-To: Your message of Sat, 27 Aug 94 23:42:27 -0700. <199408280642.XAA13665@servo.qualcomm.com>

Phil,

	Note that it is possible to change the value of the IV in CBC
mode and change the resulting first enciphered bolck in a totally
predictable fashion.  From that perspective, it would not be
appropriate to adopt the IPv4 fragment ID for an IV unless there was
also an integrity check covering this field as an integral part of the
negotiated mode of operation.  Also, I think we need to discuss
further the need for uniformity in IPv4/6 modes, since Ran's comment
suggests that the same hack can't be used in IPv6.  Finally, there may
be a need for some discussion of the desirability of binding selected
portions of the IP header into the integrity check, through means
other than encapsulation.

Steve

References:

Re: IVs, summary of discussion

From: Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>

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