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Re: (Fwd) Authentication and encryption.
>I agree that strong authentication is necessary for things like contract and
>other -non-reputable- applications.
This kind of thing doesn't need to be at an IP layer, though.
Contracts and whatnot are generally transactions that you're going to
safe-store someplace. Once they're off the network, they'll still need
signatures and integrity checks -- putting that stuff in the network
for non-repudiation is a waste of time.
From (loosely) following this discussion, it seems like there
is a bit of a conflict over what is being intended to provide security,
and where. Application level stuff is going to still be necessary. The
network level stuff is nice also, but it's not possible to completely
eliminate the need for application level signature and encryption. Trying
to build network level security into something like PGP is not going
to work; they're different animals.
Perhaps I came into the picture too late, but it'd be nice
to see a clear statement (is there one?) of the goals of this project.
What is the level and type of threat that IPSEC is intended to
protect against? Where does it fit within the complete spectrum of
security solutions? From the discussion, I'd expect that the answers
would range from something very completely engineered to something like
simple link layer encryption.
Anyone care to concisely state the security goals of this
effort, and the threats it is being designed to resist?
I suspect if we actually agree on what we're trying to do,
the rest becomes a matter of implementation details. If we're agreed
on the objective, then the number of bytes it takes to implement it
becomes an implementation detail -- from the mail here, it seems
like we're talking at 2 levels (grand design && implementation) and
neither is showing any sympathy for the issues at the other. That's
a recipe for disaster.
mjr.