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Re: IPSEC requirements

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> 
> >The trust boundary is the trusted machine.
> >I don't care about unsecure machines.  Let them die.
> 
> 	That's exactly what I mean.
> 
> 	If the trust boundary is your trusted machine, you can't
> assume that data from an untrusted machine is authentic. Even if
> it's authenticated and has the IP security stamp of approval.
> After all, if it's an unsecure machine, it should be trivial
> for an attacker to pretend to be an authorized user on your
> machine. So your machine can't trust it, and you've gone and
> built a firewall *EXACTLY* like the ones that are out there
> today, where the only machines that trust eachother are the
> ones you own.

Marcus, your basic point that you must trust the remote systems with which
you are authenticating is correct.  But network level security buys us
far more than we get with today's firewalls.  With today's firewalls you can 
only build a defense perimeter around those hosts that have direct physical
connections over those LANs/WANs that YOU directly control, and over which
you can guarantee absolute physical security.

With cryptographic protection at the network level providing peer-host
authentication, data integrity and data confidentiality, you can extend
your defense perimeter out over the unprotected networks to encompass
all of those machines that you control or trust, where ever they may
be.  This is a big win for any organization, or for any distributed service,
that spans more than a single LAN.

Charles Watt
SecureWare, Inc.

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