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Re: Modular approach to key management for IPSP
Correct me if I'm wrong, but you are assuming in your design that there
will always be a long-term shared symmetric key between the
communicating parties.
That doesn't seem to be a good assumption. You could generate the
short-lived keys from a public key exchange, or the communicating
parties may have a long-term symmetric key which they both share with a
trusted third party (Kerberos).
As near as I can tell, you're proposing that if you use one of these
schemes, such as Kerberos or X.509 public-key certificates, they be used
only to establish a long-term shared secret key --- and that long-term
secret key would only be used to establish short-term session keys.
Is this a fair characterization?
If so, it would seem that in some cases there will be a needless extra
indirection in setting up the session key.
- Ted
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