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Re: Diffie-Hellman (note by Hugo)
>From ipsec-request@ans.net Mon Dec 12 12:17:05 1994
>I agree with Hugo. The requirement of `perfect forward secrecy' is non
>trivial and does not come for free. However, since some think it is a must,
>then it would be useful to decide it is a requirement - unless we have some
>(substantial) objections. After all, we all agree that it improves security.
>If we can reach such agreement, we would be making some progress.
>
>As usual, it is up to the subscribed members of the mailing list to let their
>voices be heard in order for us to make progress - and please, supporting
>is as important as objecting.
Let me both support and object. I support perfect forward secrecy
for situations where secrecy is essential.
I dont support perfect forward secrecy where authentication, and
not secrecy, is the prime consideration. Like you said, it isn't
free. If you dont want it, dont need it, you shouldn't have to pay
for it. That is why I presented perfect forward secrecy as an
option in my SKIP talk. There are many situations in the context of
Internet applications where authentication (and not secrecy) is the
prime issue.
Ashar.
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