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Re: Diffie-Hellman (note by Hugo)


Let me second Ashar.  Different users need different levels of
security.  For those who ask for confidentiality, then I think we need
to provide strong confidentiality with perfect forward secrecy.  For
those who ask for just authentication, we need to provide strong
authentication but secrecy of any sort is not a question.

And there may be many cases where only "cookie security", as included
in Phil Karn's proposal, is needed.  If I am on a relatively trusted
local net I might be satisfied for some purposes (such as an ICMP
redirect) merely to be usre it originated locally.  I could establish
that be merely requiring it to have a cookie without any
confidentiality or further authentication.

Donald

From:  Ashar.Aziz@eng.sun.com (Ashar Aziz)
To:  hugo@watson.ibm.com, amir@watson.ibm.com
Cc:  ipsec@ans.net
>
>>From ipsec-request@ans.net Mon Dec 12 12:17:05 1994
>>I agree with Hugo. The requirement of `perfect forward secrecy' is non
>>trivial and does not come for free. However, since some think it is a must,
>>then it would be useful to decide it is a requirement - unless we have some
>>(substantial) objections. After all, we all agree that it improves security.
>>If we can reach such agreement, we would be making some progress.
>>
>>As usual, it is up to the subscribed members of the mailing list to let their
>>voices be heard in order for us to make progress - and please, supporting
>>is as important as objecting.
>
>Let me both support and object. I support perfect forward secrecy
>for situations where secrecy is essential.
>
>I dont support perfect forward secrecy where authentication, and
>not secrecy, is the prime consideration. Like you said, it isn't
>free. If you dont want it, dont need it, you shouldn't have to pay
>for it. That is why I presented perfect forward secrecy as an
>option in my SKIP talk. There are many situations in the context of 
>Internet applications where authentication (and not secrecy) is the 
>prime issue.
>
>Ashar.
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