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Ashar,

Jim Hughes' initial proposal for key management (around 5/94) already
mentioned and dealt with the issue of clogging attacks and denial of service.

Our spec, MKMP, (to which you refer above), *does* talk about defenses
against clogging attacks.
In our proposal this defense was achieved in a very satisfactory way:
just by taking advantage of the cheap signature verification in RSA,
an attacked host only pays with two multiplications to test the validity
of the incoming message. Moreover, there are *no additional* operations or
flows that the (honest) parties need to pay in order to stand
eventual clogging attacks.

The other solutions we have discussed in this list (Photuris's and the one
described by Amir) both have extra cost also for honest parties.

Hugo

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