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Re: Use of Keyed MD5
Hugo:
Jim Galvin has not written the RFC yet, but Burt Kaliski from RSA Data Security
has volunteered to help Jim with the document.
That is the only new news that I am aware of....
Russ
______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: Use of Keyed MD5
Author: hugo@watson.ibm.com at internet
Date: 01/25/95 11:29
Ref: Your note of Wed, 25 Jan 1995 09:06:40 -0500 (attached)
> Sender: rja@bodhi.itd.nrl.navy.mil
>
> Folks,
>
> It is NOT accurate to state that a "vulnerability" was discussed
> by the Security Directorate. I mentioned that Russ Housely had sent
> me an email expressing concern about the use of MD5, nothing more.
> To my knowledge (and I have mostly been in the loop), there is no
> known vulnerability. It is true that MD5 was designed as a message
> digest function and not for cryptographic authentication in the
> manner becoming commonplace within the IETF. I believe that an
> Informational RFC on the use of keyed MD5 for authentication is
> a good idea and I think one is likely to appear.
Ran, I was just citing the published (by Jeff Schiller) minutes of the
SAAG meeting (I was not there personally). They read:
Ran Atkinson reported on a vulnerability in using keyed MD5 that had
been brought to his attention. Since several protocols are
considering using keyed MD5 -- SNMPv2 already does -- Jim Galvin
volunteered to document the issues in an informational RFC.
I thought that we have the right to know the status of that issue.
Hugo