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Re: response to Last Call on: IP Authentication using Keyed MD5
To be very clear here, I'm speaking (as usual) for Perry Metzger --
not for my co-authors, just for me. These are *my* views. Take them as
such.
hugo@watson.ibm.com writes:
> The document: draft-ietf-ipsec-ah-md5-03.txt
> presents what is supposed to become the "must to implement" message
> authentication function for IPSP and IPv6. The authors of that document
> have ignored past recommendations I made to this group regarding
> the choice of this function.
I'd say that "ignored" is too strong a statement. "Felt exhausted by
the battles over the authentication transform and were too desultory
about making changes to the document because we were utterly and
completely burned out" is perhaps a much more accurate statement. We
were sort of depending on people to come up with specific language to
insert. There being none mentioned, things slouched towards last call.
I'm happy to see the suggestions you made adopted in this round,
*PROVIDED* that my co-authors don't object (big provisio) and that the
incorporation of your suggestions does not substantially delay the
adoption of the document (another big provisio). This has been a draft
for some time, and has been in last call for some time -- you did have
an opportunity to make objections a long time ago.
This is not to say that I don't want the technically best solution
adopted, but it is to say that I'm more willing to try to make the
changes when the documents move the next notch up the standardization
process than I am to let these documents, which should have been out
literally years ago, get delayed any longer.
The architecture we have adopted permits open addition of new security
transforms and it will be a simple matter to make your transform a new
one in the suite and to mandate its implementation instead of the the
existing MD5 transform in the next round of standardization. The IETF
process is very forgiving in this regard.
I'd like to say that had your results on this topic in cryptography
not been informally discussed in Danvers and had I not enormous (that
is to say, overwhelming) respect for you, Hugo, I would be of a mind
to work to have your objections tossed out right now because of how
ill timed they are. You should have been pressing us with specific
language to insert into the drafts two months ago. As it is because I
am forced to admit that you know far more about the technical merits
of one signed hash method over another than almost anyone else around
I feel like we have to bend over backwards to try to accomodate your
ideas -- but PLEASE DONT EVER DO THIS AGAIN! Next time, please bring
this all up earlier, and be mindful of the fact that the earlier set
of working group last calls were in place specifically to remind you
to jog our memory about such things.
Also remember that this is just the first move towards standardization
and that there are plenty of more opportunities to make this sort of
technical correction as we move forward.
> Hugo (Krawczyk)
Perry
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