Re: forward secrecy

["Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>]

Hilarie Orman writes:
> SKIP will probably be acceptable to some user communities.  It's
> statelessness and resulting protocol simplicity are certainly pleasing.
> But, I don't think that the schism over the threat model is going to
> disappear through persuasion, so unless a third approach emerges, combining
> PFS and statelessness, I doubt that there will be a way to satisfy all
> parties.

I'd like to note, as I periodically do, that SKIP is in no way
actually stateless. Thats just marketing hype by Ashar. In order to
use a SKIP datagram in any real system you are going to have to get
keys from a keyserver, thus almost completely obviating the claimed
advantages of SKIP.

You can, of course, operate SKIP with statically configured keys --
but in that case why not just run ESP and AH with statically
configured keys and get rid of the overhead?

Perry

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References:

• Re: forward secrecy
• From: Hilarie Orman <ho@cs.arizona.edu>

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