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Re: deriving keying material from the shared secret

To: smb@research.att.com
Subject: Re: deriving keying material from the shared secret
From: Hilarie Orman <ho@earth.hpc.org>
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 1996 09:55:13 -0400
Cc: ipsec@TIS.COM
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This is an important idea, and the OAKLEY draft makes the assumption that
the transforms can take a variable precision integer and do these things.
A separate RFC sounds like a good thing, though it should be careful to
make the hashing function generic, so that one isn't requried to use MD5
to get the key for a SHA transform.

There are some delicate issues about making sure the raw keying material
has enough bits for the transform's use that might be addressed in
such an RFC.

Follow-Ups:

Re: deriving keying material from the shared secret

From: Phil Karn <karn@unix.ka9q.ampr.org>

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