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Re: challenges for the IPSEC group
> We do need to pick a certificate format -- and that won't be easy,
> especially given the feelings on that subject. (The IETF has two
> different working groups on the topic.) If the certificates can
> have multiple signatures, we need some way to turn this signature
> graph into an authorization list. For example, I may wish to allow
> John Gilmore access to my system. But I'd should, perhaps, be a mite
> suspicious if what purported to be his certificate were signed by
> Louis Freeh. But what if it's also signed by Jeff Schiller, using
> a key I know to be valid? Or what if there are three levels of
> unknown and circular indirection in there? How do I build an ACL
> that captures the proper policy? As has been noted, a simple tree
> has operational advantages, but it's not at all clear that we can
> or should restrict ourselves to such a structure.
I noted in one mtg or other that perhaps one method would
be to co-opt some of the work being done in the RPS wg.
They are developing a policy description language with the
inital target being routing. I expect that with a couple of
twists, it could be made applicable here as an authorization
policy language.
--bill
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