Re: DNSSEC for IPSEC?

[Ian Duncan <iduncan@newbridge.com>]

On Thu, 25 Jul 1996, Dennis Glatting wrote:

> The value of DNS-SEC is if everyone uses it. Until that
> time, which may be a decade or more down the road,
> resolvers are going to have to trust any response,
> thereby reducing DNS-SEC's value to a simple checksum.

This seems overly pessimistic. Not so long ago a small number of important
public sites added policy enforcing valid PTR records before access was
granted and a most sloppy practice tightened up remarkably in less than a
year. I don't see why that pattern couldn't be repeated.

> I question the value of using DNS-SEC to aid IPSEC.

And what limited value can we get from IPSEC without DNS-SEC? 

--
     Ian Duncan <iduncan@Newbridge.com>
     Access Products Development
     Newbridge Networks Corp.

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References:

• Re: DNSSEC for IPSEC?
• From: Dennis Glatting <dennisg@plaintalk.bellevue.wa.us>

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