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Re: bandwidth in the Internet

On Tue, 10 Sep 1996, C. Harald Koch wrote:

> Increasing the ACK size to 65 bytes (20 for SKIP+ESP?) yields 660Kbps
> throughput on the forward channel; even worse.

I figure a throughput of 1.32 Mbps; not so bad.

Norm

                   Norman Shulman      Border Network Technologies Inc.
     	        Software Engineer      Tel 1 416 368 7157 ext 304
                  norm@border.com      Fax 1 416 368 7178



Date: Tue, 10 Sep 1996 15:21:08 -0400
From: Hilarie Orman <ho@earth.hpc.org>
Message-Id: <199609101921.PAA29199@earth.hpc.org>
To: skrenta@osmosys.incog.com
Cc: ipsec@TIS.COM
In-Reply-To: Yourmessage <199609101907.MAA25521@baskerville.CS.Arizona.EDU>
Subject: Re: Status of IPSEC Key Management
Sender: ipsec-approval@neptune.tis.com
Precedence: bulk

In the past Phil Karn made a compelling case for supporting 2400 baud
connections, and header minimization is a significant concern there.
Though such slow connections seemed humorous initially, it now seems that
ubiquitous wireless connections over low power, low speed links might
become a major component of the future Internet universe.



To: Stuart Jacobs <sjj0@gte.com>
Cc: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, perry@piermont.com, ipsec@TIS.COM
Subject: Re: Status of IPSEC Key Management 
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 10 Sep 1996 13:55:17 EDT."
             <2.2.32.19960910175517.0034cff0@pophost.gte.com> 
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 1996 15:31:28 EDT
From: "Angelos D. Keromytis" <angelos@gradine.cis.upenn.edu>
Sender: ipsec-approval@neptune.tis.com
Precedence: bulk
Message-ID:  <9609101532.aa01618@neptune.TIS.COM>

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In message <2.2.32.19960910175517.0034cff0@pophost.gte.com>, Stuart Jacobs writ
es:
>
>The key distribution problem of the current mobile IP drafts seem adequate
>for small network deployments.  But what will happen when 10,000 mobile
>hosts and mobile routers are roaming around in a hostile combat environment?
>I also think that  security associations Must exist between MHs and FAs as
>well as FAs and HAs in both the military and commercial areas.  The
>commercial area needs this for non-reputable billing and the military for
>network integrity.
>
This means you would compute an RSA signature over each and every
packet exchanged ? Besides, the shared secret key is established on a
need-to-have basis; clearly, not everybody needs to communicate with
everybody at the same time. And you still don't have N^2 secret keys,
just N RSA keys which you use to authenticate your public DH value.
- -Angelos
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