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RE: A little social engineering
Some more data points to consider:
- there's no RC5 hardware or CAST-128 hardware, as far as I know [ok, chip
makers, crawl out of the woodwork now and correct me, then send me samples
- there is "running code" for 3DES, CAST-128 and ARCFOUR, that I know of.
- there's no ESP docs for IDEA, present or on the radar.
- there seems to be debate on whether or not 3DES is "slow".
- what's wrong with "recommending you implement at least two ciphers" for
In some sense we were using DES because "it had been thoroughly analyzed".
Maybe it would be productive if the cryptograpy folks could help us get an
idea of what of the various other ciphers around "have been analyzed" and
Subjectively I think 3DES and CAST-128 are the ones to look at since (a)
there's code, (b) there's hardware and (c) there's a low volume of negative
cryptographic opinion on them.
This is an important discussion, IMO, but we want to find valid AND
practical solutions rather than drilling off into techno-theological
At 04:55 PM 6/20/97 -0400, you wrote:
>Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be any 'popular' alternatives to
>DES that everyone could agree on being mandatory.
> - RC5 is patented by RSA and, I believe, is licensable
> - CAST-128 is patented by Entrust, but free and is relatively new
> - IDEA is patented by ETH and licensable from Ascom Systek
>That leaves us with;
> - 3DES is slower than all of the above, but free
> - BlowFish is not that widely used and not that analyzed (Bruce
>Schneir would disagree)
>[ No slurs intended, since I'm definately not a cryptographer! ]
>>From: Robert Moskowitz[SMTP:email@example.com]
>>Sent: Friday, June 20, 1997 12:36 PM
>>Subject: A little social engineering
>>For the moment, my Chrysler and AIAG hats are off, but my first comment as
>>the new co-chair.
>>Our Default cypher in the docs is 56bit DES, and I am not inclined to
>>However, perhaps agreement can be reached on a Recommended cypher of
>>greater strength. Now our official policy is we do not concern ourselves
>>with any government policy like crypto export. But if DES is giving us
>>problems, 3DES is even worst. I understand that Isreali companies have
>>trouble exporting 3DES code, and no trouble exporting DES.
>>So take a look at the various cyphers. Perhaps we do not have to wait for
>>AES to come up with a recommendation.
>>Now putting my AIAG hat back on, this is of interest to me...