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Re: Re[6]: ISAKMP performance
Now, storing the SA off to some third party is a VERY interesting
idea. Presumably NAS(a) could send SA information to this third party,
which would obviously be trusted. Do we know of any such thing being
run today? I would assume that the keys being passed to this third
party would be encrypted using a key encryption key which only NAS(a)
could decrypt. How do most folk feel about this design?
It's quite attractive, and in fact the third party need not be trusted
in the cryptographic sense. As you note, the information is encrypted
(including an authenticity check) with a NAS(a)-only key, and hence is
tamperproof. It could fail to respond, or it could respond with a
damaged or fraudulent package, in which case the NAS simply establishes
a new security association. In other words, this third party is a cache.
But that all begs the question of whether or not it's worth doing. Well,
it's probably worth doing in the business sense, but architecturally,
if I'm running ipsec from my laptop to my firewall, I don't care whether
or not the NAS-to-firewall L2TP traffic is protected or not.