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Re: change in isakmp/oakley



To give the take of an implementor and non-cryptographer on this:

It seems appropriate that the draft should indicate the direction for
future transforms that may be cut-and-pasted in, to increase the chance it
will get done right.  Hugo wants, as I understand him, that the draft
should tell those who propose additions, that their hashes must assure the
Ni|Nr not be truncated.

A lot of the points of protocol are piddlies, and people will get them
right by convergence pretty quick.  The crypto formulas, on the other hand,
give too great an opportunity to incorporate non-obvious security holes not
discovered except by the legendary adversary who is the reason for our
existence (cripes, is that teleological or whut?).  I say better we write
all we can in warning to those making the likely future additions.

Can others please give us further encouragement on this?

At 10:33 AM 10/1/97 -0700, dharkins@ipsec.com wrote:
>  Hugo,
>
>> >   Is the (non)mixing of Ni and Nr in encryption mode authentication
broken
>> > or does it just reenforce the brokenness of certain (as yet unnamed)
prfs?
>> 
>> It may be closer to the latter, but still a MUST to fix.
>> You have no "right" to give future implementations a rope to
>> hung themselves..
>
>  I'm not claiming a right to anything (except to own handguns and assault
>weapons). In fact, I'm particularly agnostic on the whole issue-- which
>just might be a first for me :-)
>
>  But I haven't really seen a groundswell of support or opposition and that's
>a bit disheartening. Can somebody out there in ipsec-land who gives a damn
>either way speak up?
>
>  I'm willing to change the draft if enough people say it's important. I'm
>also willing to leave it alone and let people negotiate ROT-13 for encryption
>and the futuristic-key-truncating MAC for authentication (using private use
>attributes of course-- I wouldn't include them in the draft) if they're that 
>stupid.
>
>  Speak up now, please.
>
>  Dan.
>
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>Dan Harkins                                 |  E-mail:  dharkins@ipsec.com
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