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Re: draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-cbc-02.txt
> P.S. I suggest that when we revise the text of this draft, that we word
> it as saying that implementations SHOULD reject weak keys and request a
> new SA, but to not claim to have an exhaustive listing of all possible
> weak keys in the document. That way, when researchers come up with new
> and interesting weak keys in IDEA, implementations be updated without
> implementors worrying about violating the spec.
I'm a little leery about this, because it means that different
implementations would have different ideas about what constitutes a
weak key, which could lead to rarely-occurring, difficult-to-diagnose
interoperability glitches when the shared key ends up being "weak" and
one endpoint detects this and the other doesn't.
- Bill
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