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Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol to Proposed Standard
Dear IESG,
I have one serious concern about the IP Security Architecture, which is the
fact that IPSEC packets encrypt the TCP/UDP port numbers in packets.
I think this is a significant issue in a number of areas related to operating
and managing the internet (and smaller intranets). For example, these days we
are able to measure traffic growth by application type ("how much of the
traffic is HTTP traffic and how is that changing over time?" is typical of the
questions we ask there). When debugging problems, correlating packets
observed with known application behaviours ("oh, yes, that must be from a
buggy version of TN3270") is often useful. We occasionally would like to give
different classes of service to different application types.
While it is quite possible that the removal of port numbers from the cleartext
payload will *not* adversely affect the operating of the internet, i worry
that it may impact things negatively.
If i were to summarize what i would like to see done, it would be to provide
room in the cleartext portion of the IPSEC header for "32 bits of source and
destination port numbers (or their equivalent) in protocols that have the
concept of port numbers", along with "advice to implementors" that the
ultimate receiver should use these bits, if not zero, to replace the port
numbers carried within the encrypted payload. (Applications worried about
port-based traffic analysis would be able to use zeroes in the cleartext
header.)
This issue was raised (several years ago) within the IPSEC working group.
After a reasonable discussion, the working group decided to leave the port
numbers encrypted. I think that from the IPSEC working group's point of view,
this makes sense (maximum security). I am hoping that from the point of view
of the entire IETF, we may be able to decide that managing the network is
important enough to move the port numbers into the clear.
Thanks very much for your consideration in this matter,
Greg Minshall
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