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Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol to
P.S. In any case, since the hoped for standards are to be mandatory, it
seems a simple matter of public responsibility that they be subjected to a
meaningful and practical test. This seems preferable to any attempt at
proof by inspection.
On Tue, 7 Apr 1998, Steve Bellovin wrote:
>
> On Fri, 27 Mar 1998, Scott G. Kelly wrote:
> >
> > IPSEC as currently spec'd is SSSSEEEECCCCUUURRRREEE.
> >
>
> Has this been established? It seems doubtful in view of
> (i) its complexity, and (ii) its explicit support for gateways
> and "trusted networks".
>
> Lets construct a set of ten targets and award a cash prize to the
> first ten hackers to break three of them.
>
> The weaknesses that have been found thus far -- and the ones I fear in
> IKE -- have been in the cryptographic protocols. I've never yet seen
> a hacker attack one of those -- it's an arcane skill, and difficult
> for even the best cryptographers.
>
> However -- cryptography is not equivalent to security. An ipsec channel
> between a hacker and, say, an old version of sendmail will not protect
> you.
>
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