Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol to Proposed Standard

[Tero Kivinen <kivinen@ssh.fi>]

Lewis McCarthy writes:
> [1] As Matt Thomas observed, IKE does not specify what action should be taken
> in the "original" Encryption Mode of authentication in the event that the
> ID payload exceeds the maximum data size for PKCS #1 encryption with the
> peer's public RSA key.

Note, that also the revised RSA encryption mode of authentication has
this problem. The nonce size can be up to 256 bytes so you need bigger
than 2048+padding RSA bit key to encrypt that. I think in the revised
rsa encryption mode we should just say that the nonce size used must
be such that it can be encrypted using single rsa encryption
operation.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi                               Work : +358-9-4354 3207
Magnus Enckellin kuja 9 K 19, 02610, Espoo   Home : +358-9-502 1573

---

References:

• Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol to Proposed Standard
• From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ns.ietf.org>
• Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol to Proposed Standard
• From: Lewis McCarthy <lmccarth@cs.umass.edu>

---

• Prev by Date: What is meant by routing header ?
• Next by Date: public key cryptography on ISAKMP
• Prev by thread: Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol to Proposed Standard
• Next by thread: Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol to Proposed Standard
• Index(es):
  • Main
  • Thread