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Re: FW: Key Recovery

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  CJ: Non-realtime of recovery of bulk/symmetric session keys has no law
	enforcement value according to many. It also requires hugh amounts
	stable (i.e. subpoenable), secure storage. 

  If some law enforcement agency wants real time access to symmetric keys,
then they can define the protocols to do that securely, and if there is a
market (or they legislate one), I suppose that some vendors will produce
compliant products. Their protocol would presumably also apply to S/MIME,
PGP, SSL and SSH, so we in the IPsec world would be smart to let them design
the protocol. The law enforcement agencies will need clear legislation
defining (probably limiting) their liability. 

  The RSA keys used in IKE are used for signature purposes only. Escrow
of them results in a mistrial when used for law enforcement purposes because
the defendant can prove that the law enforcement agency could have fabricated
the evidence. ("Entrapment")
  Access to escrowed signature keys does not directly result in
recover of symmetric session keys, only disclosure of identities. To recover 
session keys, an active, man-in-the-middle attack must be done. 
  Further, escrow of RSA signing keys is already a feature in many PKI
offerings, and outside of the scope of both IPsec and IKE.

  If people could *PLEASE* tell whatever NARCs work at their respective
organizations to get a clue. The IETF and IPsec WG position on this has
been made clear on numerous occasions. If you don't like that, take it to
the IAB directly. Don't even bother this WG.

[Greping for "escrow" on my achives:

http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1994/03/msg00005.html      
http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1995/02/msg00042.html
http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1995/07/msg00016.html         
http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1995/12/msg00077.html     
http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1996/07/msg00046.html    
	Also:	1996/08/msg00000.html
		1996/08/msg00005.html
		1996/08/msg00018.html
		1996/08/msg00110.html
		1996/08/msg00111.html
		1996/08/msg00126.html
		1996/08/msg00128.html
		1996/08/msg00129.html
		1996/08/msg00130.html
		1996/08/msg00131.html
		1996/08/msg00137.html
		1996/09/msg00000.html
		1996/09/msg00057.html
		1996/10/msg00050.html
		1996/10/msg00058.html
		1997/09/msg00121.html
		1998/02/msg00266.html
		1998/02/msg00311.html
		1998/02/msg00333.html

   :!mcr!:            |  Sandelman Software Works Corporation, Ottawa, ON  
   Michael Richardson |	SSH IPsec: http://www.ssh.fi/. Secure, strong, international
 Personal: <A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/People/Michael_Richardson/Bio.html">mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca</A>. PGP key available.
 Corporate: <A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/SSW/">sales@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca</A>. 




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