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RE: FW: Key Recovery - nevermind!

As Rosanne Rosannadana would say 'Nevermind" and I apologize for
upsetting anyone !

	-----Original Message-----
	From:	Michael C. Richardson [SMTP:mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca]
	Sent:	Thursday, April 09, 1998 1:49 PM
	To:	ipsec@tis.com
	Cc:	CJ Gibson
	Subject:	Re: FW: Key Recovery 

	-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


	  CJ: Non-realtime of recovery of bulk/symmetric session keys
has no law
		enforcement value according to many. It also requires
hugh amounts
		stable (i.e. subpoenable), secure storage. 

	  If some law enforcement agency wants real time access to
symmetric keys,
	then they can define the protocols to do that securely, and if
there is a
	market (or they legislate one), I suppose that some vendors will
produce
	compliant products. Their protocol would presumably also apply
to S/MIME,
	PGP, SSL and SSH, so we in the IPsec world would be smart to let
them design
	the protocol. The law enforcement agencies will need clear
legislation
	defining (probably limiting) their liability. 

	  The RSA keys used in IKE are used for signature purposes only.
Escrow
	of them results in a mistrial when used for law enforcement
purposes because
	the defendant can prove that the law enforcement agency could
have fabricated
	the evidence. ("Entrapment")
	  Access to escrowed signature keys does not directly result in
	recover of symmetric session keys, only disclosure of
identities. To recover 
	session keys, an active, man-in-the-middle attack must be done. 
	  Further, escrow of RSA signing keys is already a feature in
many PKI
	offerings, and outside of the scope of both IPsec and IKE.

	  If people could *PLEASE* tell whatever NARCs work at their
respective
	organizations to get a clue. The IETF and IPsec WG position on
this has
	been made clear on numerous occasions. If you don't like that,
take it to
	the IAB directly. Don't even bother this WG.

	[Greping for "escrow" on my achives:

	http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1994/03/msg00005.html

	http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1995/02/msg00042.html
	http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1995/07/msg00016.html

	http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1995/12/msg00077.html

	http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1996/07/msg00046.html

		Also:	1996/08/msg00000.html
			1996/08/msg00005.html
			1996/08/msg00018.html
			1996/08/msg00110.html
			1996/08/msg00111.html
			1996/08/msg00126.html
			1996/08/msg00128.html
			1996/08/msg00129.html
			1996/08/msg00130.html
			1996/08/msg00131.html
			1996/08/msg00137.html
			1996/09/msg00000.html
			1996/09/msg00057.html
			1996/10/msg00050.html
			1996/10/msg00058.html
			1997/09/msg00121.html
			1998/02/msg00266.html
			1998/02/msg00311.html
			1998/02/msg00333.html

	   :!mcr!:            |  Sandelman Software Works Corporation,
Ottawa, ON  
	   Michael Richardson |	SSH IPsec: http://www.ssh.fi/. Secure,
strong, international
	 Personal: <A
HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/People/Michael_Richardson/Bio.ht
ml">mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca</A>. PGP key available.
	 Corporate: <A
HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/SSW/">sales@sandelman.ottawa.on.
ca</A>. 




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