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Re: Weak keys

To: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com>, ipsec@tis.com
Subject: Re: Weak keys
From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm-sec@htt-consult.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 1998 13:55:06 -0400
In-Reply-To: <9804211544.AA22717@kona.xedia.com>
References: <199804162232.PAA06688@gallium.network-alchemy.com><199804171407.KAA14605@dcl.MIT.EDU>
Sender: owner-ipsec@ex.tis.com

At 11:44 AM 4/21/98 -0400, Paul Koning wrote:
>
>So what I get from all this is:
>1. Handle the specified list of DES keys (and no others) in phase 1 as 
>stated, i.e., skip bits.
>2. Handle all other weak keys in all other cases by rekeying.

There was an interesting comment about weak keys some time ago.  Either
from Sommerville or McDonald to something like:

Weak keys are so rare that the code for them might never be exercised in
testing and might be flawed.

ERGO a developer might choose a strategy that keeps the weak key code as
simple as possible.

Robert Moskowitz
ICSA
Security Interest EMail: rgm-sec@htt-consult.com

Follow-Ups:

Re: Weak keys

From: Dan McDonald <danmcd@Eng.Sun.Com>

References:

Re: Weak keys

From: "Derrell D. Piper" <ddp@network-alchemy.com>

Re: Weak keys

From: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@MIT.EDU>

Re: Weak keys

From: Paul Koning <pkoning@xedia.com>

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