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Re: DES-cracker built

To: "Scott G. Kelly" <skelly@redcreek.com>
Subject: Re: DES-cracker built
From: Steve Bellovin <smb@research.att.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 1998 19:42:30 -0400
cc: "Derrell D. Piper" <ddp@network-alchemy.com>, Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.arlington.ma.us>, ipsec@tis.com
Sender: owner-ipsec@ex.tis.com

In message <35AF7CA0.AC9113D2@redcreek.com>, "Scott G. Kelly" writes:
> Derrell D. Piper wrote:
> > 
> > RE: hardware DES cracker
> > I believe that Hillary has some additional concerns even about the strength
>  of
> > that group for generating full 3DES keys...
> 
> It seems to be the consensus that the second group will give around 80
> or so bits of strength. I've been curious for some time as to how we get
> 112 bits of key strength when we begin with 85. Anyone?

In general, you can't; the more interesting question is whether or not
there is a feasible attack that has work proportional to 2^80.

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