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IKE draft - Aggressive mode auth-ted with encryption
Hi,
I'd like to bring your attention to aggressive mode
authenticated with public key encryption described in section
5.2 in "draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley-08.txt".
> When using encryption for authentication, Main Mode is defined as
> follows.
>
> Initiator Responder
> ----------- -----------
> HDR, SA -->
> <-- HDR, SA
> HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ]
> <IDii_b>PubKey_r,
> <Ni_b>PubKey_r -->
> HDR, KE, <IDir_b>PubKey_i,
> <-- <Nr_b>PubKey_i
> HDR*, HASH_I -->
> <-- HDR*, HASH_R
>
> Aggressive Mode authenticated with encryption is described as
> follows:
>
> Initiator Responder
> ----------- -----------
> HDR, SA, [ HASH(1),] KE,
> <IDii_b>Pubkey_r,
> <Ni_b>Pubkey_r -->
> HDR, SA, KE, <IDir_b>PubKey_i,
> <-- <Nr_b>PubKey_i, HASH_R
> HDR, HASH_I -->
>
Aggressive mode reduces amount of messages in the protocol
by combining two messages into a single message.
It would be more reasonable, on my opinion, in aggressive
mode to keep the same order of payloads as used in main mode.
It would be easier to remember the payload order as well,
if we know that the payloads order in the main mode is
similar. I assume that there might not be the perfect
rule for each mode of protocol, but we should make it
so where it is possible.
I propose that we change
> HDR, SA, [ HASH(1),] KE,
to
> HDR, SA, KE, [ HASH(1),]
I know that it is not very critical for the
technical part of protocol. However, I think
there is no point to leave it as it is.
Thanks.
Yuri Poeluev
Certicom Corp.
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