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Re: Multicast Key Management (was Re: Anycast)
Yes, I remember that. (I also remember the last time you referred to
me as "somebody" in a post to this list. Talk about amusing! I've received
idle threats before but never have my friends been contacted....)
The example I chose was poor but note that that application already
accepts a certain amount of key piracy-- acceptable loss, it's calculated
into their anticipated profits. They still make a sizable amount of money
in spite of it and it doesn't stop them from doing the whole thing over
again. I suggest you look into the DOCSIS protocol to see what the
cable content providers settle for, the bar is pretty low. Also, one
million set-top boxes running an embedded OS which contains a decryption
key does not necessarily mean that that key is _known_ to one million in
a manner that would allow for key leakage. It is not beyond the realm of
possibility that access to the key will be enforced (imbedded certs in
the set-top box as a for instance) and that my laptop would not be able to
acquire the key even if it's running code from the same base as my set-top
box which is able to acquire the key.
By putting authentication in quotes are you implying that the key
is not distributed in a mutually authenticated manner? Would you mind
pointing out where in the protocol this is happening?
Dan.
On 17 Dec 1998 14:16:28 EST you wrote
>
> Anyone remember the amusing discussion at the D.C. IETF where someone
> proposed a multicast key management system to deal with television
> broadcasts, and folks kept coming up to say "sorry, but how will you
> keep anything known by a million people a secret? how does your
> "authentication" authenticate anything worth mentioning?"
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