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Re: transport-friendly ESP

To: Alex Alten <Alten@home.com>
Subject: Re: transport-friendly ESP
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Date: 01 Feb 1999 09:37:30 -0500
Cc: Frank Kastenholz <kasten@argon.com>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, Steve Bellovin <smb@research.att.com>, ipsec@tis.com, jis@MIT.EDU, mleech@nortel.ca, tf-esp@research.att.com
In-Reply-To: Alex Alten's message of "Mon, 01 Feb 1999 01:41:56 -0800"
References: <3.0.3.32.19990130194427.00afa230@mail> <v0401170cb2d7d08a8fd5@[128.33.238.173]> <3.0.3.32.19990127200721.00b553e0@mail> <199901280234.VAA03373@smb.research.att.com> <3.0.3.32.19990201014156.00b23290@mail>
Reply-To: perry@piermont.com
Sender: owner-ipsec@ex.tis.com

Alex Alten <Alten@home.com> writes:
> Thank you for your detailed analysis about why a block 
> cipher like DES will not work for a core router.  It's a 
> bit like saying why a 2400 baud modem won't work either.
> 
> Why can't we design, implement and verify a cipher that can
> meet these constraints you point out in such detail?

Security has to be end to end. You can't trust the operators of every
router on the internet. There is NOT ANY POINT in designing such a
thing, even if one could, and one can't.

Perry

References:

Re: transport-friendly ESP

From: Alex Alten <Alten@home.com>

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