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Re: IPSec IP Telephony:End to End or Segment
Henry Spencer writes:
> The PSTN is fairly secure against casual snooping, somewhat insecure
> (at the ends) against knowledgeable snoopers, and completely open to
> government agencies (and possibly others with plenty of cash).
I'm rather curious about what will happen when governments' legal
wiretappability requirements for telecom carriers collide with RFC
1984 and IP telephony secured with end-to-end encryption.
This assumes the latter technology becomes widely used, which isn't a
foregone conclusion IMHO. How sturdy will the Danvers Doctrine be
when (e.g.) the FBI wants CALEA-style call-content intercepts of IP
telephony sessions? Maybe LEAs that can't resort to drastic methods
will just be out of luck in the end. But in the interim I expect
they will try to map their PSTN wiretap capabilities into the IPTEL
I speak at most for myself, except where specifically stated otherwise.
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