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Re: IPSec IP Telephony:End to End or Segment

In message <37016EC7.9F07D053@cs.umass.edu>, Lewis McCarthy writes:
> Henry Spencer writes:
> > The PSTN is fairly secure against casual snooping, somewhat insecure 
> > (at the ends) against knowledgeable snoopers, and completely open to 
> > government agencies (and possibly others with plenty of cash).
> I'm rather curious about what will happen when governments' legal 
> wiretappability requirements for telecom carriers collide with RFC 
> 1984 and IP telephony secured with end-to-end encryption.  

CALEA does not prohibit end-to-end encryption, nor does it mandate any
form of key escrow.  *If* the end-to-end encryption is provided by the
carrier -- say, if the carrier does the key distribution -- then there
is an obligation (in the U.S., of course -- your government may vary)
on the carrier to turn over the key.  If the communicating parties set
up their own session, say via something like PGPphone, CALEA doesn't
apply.  (Rather, the obligation on the carrier would be to turn over
the ciphertext, and let Ft. Meade figure it out.)