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RFC2409

Ivars Suba writes:
> IPSec/IKE (RFC2409) Public Key Encryption Aggressive mode"(Phase 1)
> vulnerability is myself advice. It seems that IPSec/IKE Public Key
> Encryption Revised Aggressive Mode and IPSec/IKE Pre-Shared Key Aggressive
> Mode also vulnerable to this type of attack (Chess grandmaster). However,
> they will be stopped at Phase 2 - Quick Mode (ISAKMP payload is Encrypted).
> If Initiator and Cheater will share DHPrivKey_i, they will continue this
> attack against Responder in Phase 2 - Quick Mode still :). For more detailed
> information look in appendice.

How can the cheater convince the Initiator to use his public key
instead of the responder? If the Initiator uses Responders public key
the C cannot know the value of Ni, thus it cannot calcute the Hash
payload, because the Ni is needed there. I don't think this "attack"
would work. 
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