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Re: Dangling phase 2 SAs (was RE: issues from the bakeoff)
"bounds the authenticated lifetime"? Does the "authenticatedness" somehow
get diluted as time goes on? I guess I hadn't realized that.
Phase 1 lifetimes are set to prevent too much use of a key. If it was
OK to use the key at X but not a X plus some delta and time delta ticks
off then it's not OK to use the key _any more_ but it doesn't necessarily
mean that delta seconds ago it wasn't. Using the new lifetime that
Kivinen came up with (which is a great idea) makes this more apparent.
You want to do negotiate N pairs of IPSec SAs. Once you negotiate that Nth
pair it is not OK to negotiate anymore so you delete the IKE SA but that
doesn't mean that the Nth pair of IPSec SAs you just negotiated is somehow
bad or unauthenticated.
What I think is unnecessary is the level of complexity involved in
doing what's described in draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-01.txt.
Dan.
On Thu, 17 Jun 1999 14:34:09 EDT you wrote
> Phase 1 re-keying is discussed in some detail in
> <draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-01.txt>.
>
> Also, the act of orphaning phase 2 SAs (as described below) in my mind is
> both unnecessary and also insecure, since the phase 1 SA is what bounds the
> authenticated lifetime of the end points. So to leave a phase 2 SA up
> without a valid phase 1 SA is to let it live beyond its allowed limits.
>
>
>
> ---
> Tim Jenkins TimeStep Corporation
> tjenkins@timestep.com http://www.timestep.com
> (613) 599-3610 x4304 Fax: (613) 599-3617
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