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RE: Dangling phase 2 SAs (was RE: issues from the bakeoff)
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The issue of dangling phase 2 SAs seems to have created a camp that
believes that when a certificate is revoked, a compromise has
occured, and therefore any phase 2 SAs created under the phase 1 SA
with a now revoked certificate as the authentication mechanism should
be removed.
Point 1: Compromise? What compromise?
There are many reasons to revoke a certificate that in no way
invalidates authorizations that certificate performed prior to the
revokation. For example, an employee leaves a company, the company
revokes that employees certificate. Actions that employee took while
still employed are still valid.
Point 2: That compromise didn't hurt this old SA.
If a compromise occurs on a phase 1 authorization mechanism (such as:
private key stolen or shared secret blurted out in the throws of
passion), obviously, the phase 2 SAs under that mechanism created
_after_ the compromise are suspect :-).
But, the phase 2 SAs created _prior_ to the compromised are not
suspect if perfect forward secrecy is used (and the Phase 1 SAs get
deleted ASAP). The phase 2 SAs may not even be suspect if perfect
forward secrecy is not used as long as the host whose authorization
is in question is not compromised.
- -Michael Heyman
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