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CHoosing a second manditory cipher for IPSec
>>>>> "Bruce" == owner-ipsec <owner-ipsec@lists.tislabs.com> writes:
Bruce> Version 4.1 Date: Thu, 15 Jul 1999 08:50:44 -0500 To:
Bruce> ipsec@lists.tislabs.com From: Bruce Schneier
Bruce> <schneier@counterpane.com> Subject: CHoosing a second manditory
...
Bruce> The question comes down to why IPSec needs a second cipher.
Bruce> Remember that any implementation of IPSec will probably be as
Bruce> secure as the weakest of the two cipher choices (under the
Bruce> assumption that an attacker can force a choice, or at least on the
Bruce> assumption that the users will have no idea which cipher to
Bruce> choose). I think giving users a choice is a bad idea, and that
Bruce> one strong cipher is better than two strong ciphers.
This is true. The reason to pick two is to guarantee that it will be widely
available, and thus when the user *does* decide to make a choice for the
stronger one (probably based upon new attacks) that he can get both ends to
cooperate without going through a patch release cycle, etc.
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] Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works, Ottawa, ON |net architect[
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