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RE: Retransmits in traffic count?
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ricky Charlet [mailto:rcharlet@redcreek.com]
> Sent: August 5, 1999 12:06 PM
> To: Tim Jenkins
> Cc: ipsec@lists.tislabs.com
> Subject: Re: Retransmits in traffic count?
>
> Actually, I can't think of a reason not to count the
> retransmissions in
> all of these counters. (that don't mean there ain't one!)
> Could you tell
> us about the potential motivations you see for
> this?
>
Potential reasons why not:
It doesn't really count against the lifetime of the keying material, since
there is no new information offered to an attacker since the re-transmits
are identical. (I'd like a crypto expert to confirm or dispute this, if
possible.)
It might be more difficult to implement, since the process of encryption
(and thus counting expirations) is likely to be in a completely different
process/thread/chunk-of-code than the process of handling the time-outs and
re-transmissions.
That's all I can think of. Neither of them are very strong one way or the
other; perhaps that's why I didn't get any objections to the original
wording in the MIB. But on the other hand, I got so few comments, I wasn't
sure anyone had read it...
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