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RE: Shared Secret mismatch in AM3/MM5
Right. That's why so many implementations rely on aggresive mode for remote
access IPSec hosts. Maybe in the future they will use base mode instead, as
it affords somewhat more flexibility for the remote access case.
-----Original Message-----
From: Jianying Zhou [mailto:jyzhou@krdl.org.sg]
Sent: Thursday, October 28, 1999 6:23 PM
To: Walker, Jesse
Cc: 'Ricky Charlet'; ipsec@lists.tislabs.com; Andrew Krywaniuk
Subject: RE: Shared Secret mismatch in AM3/MM5
On Thu, 28 Oct 1999, Walker, Jesse wrote:
> Rick,
>
> I don't know what the designers were thinking, but consider
> man-in-the-middle for a minute. In order to defeat it, the IKE
> authentication proof has to demonstrate the peer's knowledge of both the
> shared secret and the negotiated Diffie-Hellman keying material. The
design
> of IKE does this quite effectively by binding the two together in a single
> hash. If you remove the binding, then you reenable man-in-the-middle if
you
> don't introduce some other means to tie them together.
>
> -- Jesse
>
But that kind of definition of SKEYID excludes nodadic users in the main
mode with pre-shared key for authentication.
Jianying