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IPSEC SA DELETE in "dangling" implementations
Slava Kavsan wrote:
> Here is the dilemma: if "dangling" implementation wants to send IPSec
SA
> DELETE message, while the "parent" IKE SA is no longer there (expired
or
> deleted), the alternatives are (and I do not like either of them):
> a) do not send DELETE
> b) re-negotiate IKE SA before sending DELETE
> Any suggestions?
A third option is to design a oneway authenticated message
(proofed against replay attacks). Such oneway authenticated message
can be used for 'delete', 'invalid spi' and other notifications.
If such a design is possible then it is not necessary to establish
IKE SA to send a 'delete' notification.
The oneway message could be authenticated using a signatures
or hash generated using preshared secret, could include the
id payload to allow the peer to identify the matching shared
secret in the case of the pre-shared secret. The oneway message
could also use as part of the hash information from the event
causing the notification to be generated. This could prevent
replay attacks.
Any thoughts on this?
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