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RE: Aggressive/Base Mode Signature Queries
Re: Jesse's question
Perhaps another way of
looking at it is that in Jesse's example
A1 and B1 have C1 in common, and A2 and B2
share a CA C2. It's not that A and B share
two CAs {C1 and C2}. The different names (A1, A2) are different identities
from the protocol viewpoint.
So if A doesn't have a cert from C2 for
identity A1, and C2 is the only one trusted by B1, then A1 and B1
can't communicate, although if A tries to communicate via identity
A2 it will work (assuming B1 trusts CA2).
Given Jesse's quote from the spec:
The
responder to the Certificate Request payload MUST send its
certificate, if certificates are supported, based on the values
contained in the payload.
It doesn't seem right to respond with a certificate from a different
CA than was requested by the other side. So in any case, it
would seem like the spec is clear that if you don't have a cert
from the CA requested by the other side for the
identity with which you initiated contact, authentication fails.
Perhaps some heuristics might be good, like if A1 asks B1 for
a cert from CA1, and B1 has one, AND B1 trusts CA1 (as well
as perhaps other CAs), B1 should request a cert from CA1 in preference to
any of the other CAs that B1 also trusts.
Radia
Follow-Ups: