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Re: ipsec error protocol
> a) not everyone knows how many times that host rebooted so far. So
> the latest cert of birth should be included in every phase 1
> negotiation.
I said.. "in the negotiation of the IKE SA".. same thing.
BTW, from the embedded device front, my understanding is that SNMPv3
security uses a reboot counter, so maintaining this shouldn't be a
problem for the embedded folks.
> b) if an attacker finds a way to reboot a host generating certs of
> birth, this can force the signing host (either the host itself (self
> signed cert)) or the CA to sign an enormous amount of data, therefor
> weakening its private key (clear text attack). I do not know how
> efficient that would be but I would welcome the advice of a
> cryptographer.
I used the term "certificate" in the generic sense. In some sense it
could be more accurately described as a "death certificate for all
prior state".
It wouldn't have to be (and probably shouldn't be) in x.509
format.. (x.509 specifies one way to do "certificates"; it is not the
only way to do certificates, and in some cases, like this one, an
application-specific format is appropriate).
- Bill
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