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Re: IPsec and RTP crypto
>> i don't think it a "poor fit" in mobile-ip6 case.
>Here's a more specific concern:
>The use of ipsec for protecting piggybacked binding updates interferes
>with safe use of ipsec opportunistic encryption.
>A service may set up a listening tcp port with a policy which says
>"allow cleartext, or AH-protected, but once encryption is used,
>require it on all subsequent packets".
>Now, it receives an AH-protected TCP SYN with a binding update
>attached (which seems to be a highly likely combination).
>Is the receiver to interpret the use of ipsec for that packet as:
>a) an indication that all other traffic on this connection will be
>protected with AH?
>b) a signal that just the segment with the binding update is protected
>and to expect cleartext on other packets?
>The conservative thing to do is to assume (a), and prevent the
>connection from being assassinated by forged unauthenticated RST's.
i see. in this case AH is not the culprit, mobile-ip6 binding update
piggyback is! i don't understand why people are attacking AH.
itojun
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