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Re: application layer cross checking



At 12:52 PM 5/3/01 -0700, Michael Thomas wrote:
>Derek Atkins writes:
> > Because applications may not be ipsec peers...  Or, in most cases,
> > ipsec will be host-based, not user-based?
>
>   What's the difference? Why shouldn't I be able to
>   tell the socket layer which identity I want it 
>   to use for a particular 5-tuple, and the receiving
>   end be able to verify that, including the application
>   layer being able to cross check? 
> 
>   If you can't do that, it sure seems like transport
>   mode is severely hamstrung. As in, why bother?

Aren't there more hardware acceleration products available for use with
IPSEC vs. doing data encryption at the application layer?

Jonathan

>
>	   Mike
>
> > 
> > -derek
> > 
> > Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:
> > 
> > > Derek Atkins writes:
> > >  > There is (currently) no API available to do what you want.
> > >  > One reason is that IPSec authentication need not be user-based
> > >  > authentication, so how would you pass that up to an application
> > >  > and what good would it do?
> > > 
> > >    Well, for one thing it could prevent this attack. Isn't
> > >    that enough? I'm aware that there may be situations
> > >    where the two may differ, but there are probably 
> > >    an equal number where identities are the same, so
> > >    why should each application have to roll its own
> > >    identity module in that case?
> > > 
> > > 		  Mike
> > > 
> > >  > 
> > >  > -derek
> > >  > 
> > >  > Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com> writes:
> > >  > 
> > >  > > I've had a nagging question for a long time which
> > >  > > I'm hoping that somebody can shed some light on.
> > >  > > 
> > >  > > Suppose I have a linux box running Freeswan
> > >  > > talking to a Solaris 8 box. Suppose also that we
> > >  > > have a way to mutually authenticate each other at
> > >  > > the IPsec level (pre-shared, certs, whatever).
> > >  > > Suppose also that this is just a transport mode
> > >  > > SA. Is there any API which prevents the following
> > >  > > kind of attack?
> > >  > > 
> > >  > > Mike's-box		Server
> > >  > > ------------------------------
> > >  > > ----------------------------->
> > >  > > IKE: DN=mike@mtcc.com
> > >  > > 
> > >  > > <-----------------------------
> > >  > > IKE: DN=server@server.com
> > >  > > 
> > >  > > ----------------------------->
> > >  > > SIP: INVITE 
> > >  > > From: gwb@whitehouse.gov
> > >  > > [...]
> > >  > > 
> > >  > > <-----------------------------
> > >  > > 200 OK, George
> > >  > > 
> > >  > > 
> > >  > > Ie, that I can authenticate myself for IPsec, but
> > >  > > forge my credentials at L7. I would expect that
> > >  > > there should be an API to get the credentials
> > >  > > presented for IPsec back up to the app. My
> > >  > > understanding is that Microsoft doesn't provide
> > >  > > any kernel API at all, and I didn't immediately
> > >  > > see anything in PFKEY, though I didn't look hard
> > >  > > so feel free to flame me.
> > >  > > 
> > >  > > If there's not such an API, what was the reason?
> > >  > > This would seem like a pretty heavy burden to
> > >  > > recreate all of the identity machinery at the app
> > >  > > level to cover this attack.
> > >  > > 
> > >  > > 	       Mike
> > >  > 
> > >  > -- 
> > >  >        Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
> > >  >        Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
> > >  >        URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
> > >  >        warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available
> > 
> > -- 
> >        Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
> >        Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
> >        URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
> >        warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available



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