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Re: AES Key Integrity



On Tue, 26 Jun 2001, Chris Trobridge wrote:

 > It has just occurred to me that I've not noticed any references to a
 > standard integrity mechanism for AES.
 >
 > Will there be one?
 >
 > DES has parity, but a CRC would be better.
 >
 > As crypto gets (theoretically) stronger issues like reliability become much
 > more important.

This is an important issue, but it does not (and should not) depend on the
concrete algorithm like AES. The subscribers from NIST to this list might
want to consider adopting a standard for storing cryptographic keys (of
any algorithm) for increasing reliability. Of course, standard here is
mainly needed for interoperability: All you need is an error-correcting
code (ECC) together with an optional (keyed?) hash. (Unkeyed hash does not
really seem to be necessary if one already employes an ECC.) For most of
the purposes a very simple ECC like Hamming code is good enough.

Helger
PS What a nice scary signature...

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