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RE: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-00.txt
What is the purpose/motivation behind the AH Envelope? It seems like
needless overhead to me.
What is the purpose/motivation of the long period (default 5 minutes)
keepalive mentioned in the second paragraph of section 4?
Why bother providing even a MAY for support of AH? Only support for IPv4 AH
is specified, in which case ESPNULL provides practically the same protection
(yes AH protects 3 historic security options, the router alert option which
is noted to be incompatible with IPsec, and the multi-destination delivery
option but how often are these options actually used?). In the past people
have been jumping up and down about IKE/IPsec already being too complex. I
think this is a case where added complexity provides very little benefit.
Just for the fun of causing trouble and stoking fires: I noticed that the
NAT-traversal drafts were published under the auspices of the WG instead of
as individual submissions. I thought there was an edict that the WG would
not support changes to IKE/IPsec. Has the edict been dropped, or is it a
wish-washy edict, or are IDs with lots of authors from powerful companies
exempt?
-dave