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Re: Position statement on IKE development




Several people have asked me for the urls of the paper's analyzing
IPsec and IKE.  These are the ones I found searching the web last
night.

A Cryptographic Evaluation of IPsec
by Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier
http://www.counterpane.com/ipsec.pdf

Analysis of the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Using the NRL Protocol Analyzer
by Catherine Meadows
http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/publications/CHACS/1999/1999meadows-IEE
E99.ps

IKE/ISAKMP Considered Dangerous
by William Simpson
draft-simpson-danger-isakmp-01.txt
http://www.alternic.org/drafts/drafts-s-t/draft-simpson-danger-isakmp-01.html


BTW Henry,

The issue is not that parts of IPsec are superfluous.  

The question is if IKE is broken then is IPsec also broken?  

- Alex





At 10:21 AM 8/3/2001 -0400, Henry Spencer wrote:
>On Thu, 2 Aug 2001, Alex Alten wrote:
>> ...Their suggestion to use a process like NIST's for selecting
>> the AES standard is an excellent one. It's a pity they did not suggest
>> it a decade ago. However it should be considered seriously not only
>> for the replacement of IKE, but possibly also for the modification or
>> simplification of the entire IPsec protocol suite...
>
>I think this is throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
>
>While the packet-level parts (ESP etc.) do have some flaws, most of those
>can be fixed simply by taking a big black pen and crossing out superfluous
>parts of the existing specs (e.g., all of RFC 2402).  While there is room
>for some debate about exactly which parts should be crossed out (e.g.,
>there are people who still think AH is useful), I think there would be
>little or no support for redesigning the surviving parts.  So a design
>competition does not seem very useful in this area.  Moreover, *this* is
>the area where there is massive investment in silicon, solder traces, etc. 
>Just deleting features does not, by and large, invalidate that investment.
>
>IKE is the disaster area.  The rest of IPsec could use some judicious
>featurectomies, but is not badly broken.
>
>                                                          Henry Spencer
>                                                       henry@spsystems.net
>
>
>
--

Alex Alten

Alten@Home.Com




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