Re: Require AH?

[Michael Thomas <mat@cisco.com>]

Dan McDonald writes:
 > Some HW folks didn't think you could do AH in hardware.  I've heard other HW
 > folks (but only after the fact) say that you can indeed do AH in hardware.

   I have great confidence that hardware guys can
   do just about anything you set them out to do.
   It's only the final transistor count that tells
   you whether it is worth the effort.

 > ESP authentication was a knee-jerk reaction to Bellovin's analysis of
 > 1825-1827.  He stated the threats of unauthenticated CBC encryption + replay
 > problems.  The knee-jerk reaction was to add both of these properties to ESP,
 > without first thinking that requiring a fixed AH with replay protection could
 > do the trick.

   Actually, what would make me most happy would be to
   have a single IPsec extension header which does
   *everything*. This helps on the code/message
   compactness front, as well as simplifying the
   number of SADB entries, different protocols
   handling, header traversal, etc. It seems to me
   that if we had modes like gzip-aes-cbc-sha1 for
   ESP transforms, we could get rid of both AH and
   IPCOMP.

		Mike

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Follow-Ups:

• Re: Require AH?
• From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>

References:

• Require AH?
• From: Sandy Harris <sandy@storm.ca>
• Re: Require AH?
• From: Dan McDonald <danmcd@East.Sun.COM>

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