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Re: Simplifying IKE



Andrew Krywaniuk wrote:
>I can't think of a realistic threat model that PFS solves.

Think of an IPSEC gateway that allows short-term tunnels for many laptops
in road-warrior configuration.  Without PFS, if your gateway gets hacked,
the keys for every laptop that has ever used that gateway could become
compromised.  With PFS, if your gateway gets hacked, only the keys for
the laptops currently using the gateway (during the time period until
the penetration is detected and repaired) are at risk.

I believe that PFS is a truly useful feature of IPSEC, and the decision
to provide PFS was well-discussed many years ago on this list, if I recall
correctly.


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