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RE: IKEv2 (son-of-ike) draft
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-ipsec@lists.tislabs.com
> [mailto:owner-ipsec@lists.tislabs.com]On Behalf Of
> dharkins@tibernian.com
> Sent: Saturday, November 17, 2001 11:11 PM
> To: ipsec@lists.tislabs.com
> Subject: IKEv2 (son-of-ike) draft
>
>
> This draft was submitted but hasn't shown up yet in the repository
> (the I-D editor is, no doubt, swamped) so in the interest of giving
> people more time to look at it prior to Salt Lake here's a link:
>
> http://www.lounge.org/draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-00.txt
>
> Please send comments to the list.
>
> Dan.
>
Hi,
Some comments on IKEV2 draft. The comments are based on early version
of the draft, but my quick review indicates there is not much difference
between what I reviewed versus the published one.
Regards,
-- sankar --
General Comments
----------------
o PreShared keys are not described. If they are not supported,
the rationale for not supporting them will be useful.
o Is IKEV2 document supposed to combine RFC 2409, 2408 and 2407?
As stated the document seems to meet the purpose of being a
single point of reference. However some details are missing and
requires referring back to the RFCS 2408, 2409.
For example,
Description on IKE exhanges are missing.
hash payload description is missing (as in section of 5 of RFC 2409)
o Is aggressive mode exchange supported?
There seems to be no description of a mode where ID can be sent
in the first packet? Does it mean the responder should always
select the policy based on ip address? This may be limiting in
scenarios where policy is detmined by not what the end-station
can support - but who the peer is.
o section 2.9 describes that the absence of TR payload means
no restriction. Wildcard support is a major difference from
IKEV1 and should be called out in section 1.2
o section 1.2 indicates that the hash problem in [1] has been
addressed, but I could not find the detail about that inside.
Also references are missing.
o Description in many places seem to imply that IKEV2 does not
support dangling ipsec SAs. This should be called out
in section 1.2.
o In IKEV2 message id is maintained as a sequence number. IKEV2 also
allows multiple ipsec SA negotiations to go in parallel. These two
seem contradictory, since parallel ipsec SA negotiations may require
an ike endpoint to maintain information about more than 10 exchanges.
One could always negotiate all the required source-dest address
combinations in one ipsec SA negotiation(as IKEV2 seems to allow a
rich set of TARGET Records), but an end-point is not prevented from
negotiating multiple SAs in parallel.
o Appendix B seems to imply the use of explicit IV as in ESP.
This is a major difference. It would be useful to add more
description including the payload format.
Other comments inline.
>IPSEC Working Group Dan Harkins
>INTERNET-DRAFT Charlie Kaufman
> Radia Perlman
> editors
>draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-00.txt November 2001
>
>
> The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol
> <draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-00.txt>
>
>
> Status of this Memo
>
> This document is an Internet Draft and is in full conformance with
> all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026 [Bra96]. Internet Drafts are
> working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its
> areas, and working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
> working documents as Internet Drafts.
>
> Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
> and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
> time. It is inappropriate to use Internet Drafts as reference
> material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
>
> To learn the current status of any Internet Draft, please check the
> "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet Drafts Shadow
> Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe),
> munnari.oz.au (Australia), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or
> ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).
>
>
> Abstract
>
> This document describes version 2 of the IKE (Internet Key Exchange)
> protocol. IKE performs mutual authentication and establishes an IKE
> security association that can be used to efficiently establish SAs
> for ESP, AH and/or IPcomp. This version greatly simplifies IKE by
> replacing the 8 possible phase 1 exchanges with a single exchange
> based on public signature keys. The single exchange provides
> identity hiding, yet works in 2 round trips (all the identity hiding
> exchanges in IKE v1 required 3 round trips). Latency of setup of an
> IPsec SA is further reduced from IKEv1 by allowing setup of an SA for
> ESP, AH, and/or IPcomp to be piggybacked on the initial IKE exchange.
> It also improves security by allowing the Responder to be stateless
> until it can be assured that the Initiator can receive at the claimed
> IP source address. This version also presents the entire protocol in
> a single self-contained document, in contrast to IKEv1, in which the
> protocol was described in ISAKMP (RFC 2408), IKE (RFC 2409), and the
> DOI (RFC 2407) documents.
>
>
>Table of Contents
>
>
> 1. Introduction
> 1.1 The IKE Protocol
> 1.2 Changes from IKEv1
> 1.3 Requirements Terminology
> 2 Protocol Overview
> 2.1 Use of Retransmission Timers
> 2.2 Use of Sequence Numbers for Message ID
> 2.3 Window Size for overlapping requests
> 2.4 State Synchronization and Connection Timeouts
> 2.5 Version Numbers and Forward Compatibility
> 2.6 Cookies
> 2.7 Cryptographic Negotiation
> 2.8 Rekeying
> 2.9 Traffic Restriction Negotiation
> 2.10 Nonces
> 3 The Phase 1 Exchange
> 3.1 Authentication of the IKE-SA
> 4 The CREATE-CHILD-SA (Phase 2) Exchange
> 4.1 Generating Keying Material for Child-SAs
> 5 Informational (Phase 2) Exchange
> 6 Error Handling
> 7 Header and Payload Formats
> 7.1 The IKE Header
> 7.2 Generic Payload Header
> 7.3 Security Association Payload
> 7.3.1 Proposal Substructure
> 7.3.2 Transform Substructure
> 7.3.3 Transform Attributes
> 7.3.4 Attribute Negotiation
> 7.4 Key Exchange Payload
> 7.5 Identification Payload
> 7.6 Certificate Payload
> 7.7 Certificate Request Payload
> 7.8 Signature Payload
> 7.9 Nonce Payload
> 7.10 Notify Payload
> 7.10.1 Notify Message Types
> 7.11 Delete Payload
> 7.12 Vendor ID Payload
> 7.13 Traffic Restriction Payload
> 8 Diffie-Hellman Groups
> 9 Security Considerations
> 10 IANA Considerations
> 10.1 Attribute Classes
> 10.2 Encryption Algorithm Class
> 10.3 Hash Algorithm
> 10.4 Group Description and Group Type
> 10.5 Life Type
> 11 Acknowledgements
> 12 References
> Appendix A
> Appendix B: Cryptographic Protection of IKE Data
> Authors' Addresses
>
>
> 1 Introduction...................................................2
> 2 Terms and Definitions..........................................3
> 3 Protocol Overview..............................................6
> 4 Header and Payload Formats.....................................9
> 5 IKE Exchanges.................................................11
> 5.1 Phase 1 Exchange............................................11
> 5.2 Anti-Replay for Post-Phase 1 Exchanges......................12
> 5.3 Phase 2 Exchange............................................12
> 5.4 Informational Exchange......................................12
> 6 Rekeying......................................................13
> 6.1 Phase 1 Rekeying............................................14
> 6.2 Phase 2 Rekeying............................................23
> 7 Mandatory Options.............................................31
> 8 IKE Internal State............................................32
> 8.1 Phase 1 State...............................................33
> 8.2 Phase 2 State...............................................34
> 9 Diffie-Hellman Groups.........................................35
> 10 Payload Explosion of Sample Exchange.........................36
> 11 Security Considerations......................................35
> 12 IANA Considerations..........................................36
> 13 Acknowledgements.............................................37
> 14 References...................................................37
> Appendix A......................................................40
> Appendix B......................................................43
> Author's Address................................................45
>
>1. Introduction
>
> IP Security (IPsec) provides confidentiality, data integrity, and
> data source authentication to IP datagrams. These services are
> provided by maintaining shared state between the source and the sink
> of an IP datagram. This state defines, among other things, the
> specific services provided to the datagram, which cryptographic
> algorithms will be used to provide the services, and the keys used as
> input to the cryptographic algorithms.
>
> Establishing this shared state in a manual fashion does not scale
> well. Therefore a protocol to establish this state dynamically is
> needed. This memo describes such a protocol-- the Internet Key
> Exchange (IKE). This is version 2 of IKE. Version 1 of IKE was
> defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, and 2409. This single document is
> intended to replace all three of those RFCs.
>
>
>1.1 The IKE Protocol
>
> IKE performs mutual authentication between two parties and
> establishes an IKE security association that includes shared secret
> information that can be used to efficiently establish SAs for ESP
> (RFC 2406), AH (RFC 2402) and/or IPcomp (RFC 2393). We call the IKE
> SA an "IKE-SA", and the SAs for ESP, AH, and/or IPcomp that get set
> up through that IKE-SA we call "child-SA"s.
>
> We call the setup of the IKE-SA "phase 1" and subsequent IKE
> exchanges "phase 2" even though setup of a child-SA can be
> piggybacked on the initial phase 1 exchange. The phase 1 exchange is
> two request/response pairs. A phase 2 exchange is one
> request/response pair, and can be used to create or delete a child-
> SA, delete the IKE-SA, or give information such as error conditions.
>
> IKE message flow always consists of a request followed by a response.
> It is the responsibility of the requester to ensure reliability. If
> the response is not received within a timeout interval, the requester
> retransmits the request.
>
> The first request/response of a phase 1 exchange, which we'll call
> IKE_SA_init, negotiates security parameters for the IKE-SA, and sends
> Diffie-Hellman values. We call the response IKE_SA_init_response.
>
> The second request/response, which we'll call IKE_auth, transmits
> identities, proves knowledge of the private signature key, and
> optionally sets up an SA for AH and/or ESP and/or IPcomp. We call
> the response IKE_auth_response.
>
> If the Responder feels it is under attack, and wishes to use a
> stateless cookie (see section on cookies). it can respond to an
> IKE_SA_init with an IKE_SA_init_reject with a cookie value that must
> be sent in order with a subsequent IKE_SA_init_request. The
> Initiator then sends another IKE_SA_init, but this time including the
> Responder's cookie value.
>
> Phase 2 exchanges each consist of a single request/response pair. The
> types of exchanges are CREATE_CHILD_SA (creates a child-SA), or an
> informational exchange which deletes a child-SA or the IKE-SA or
> informs the other side of some error condition. All these messages
> require a response, so an informational message with no payloads can
> serve as a check for aliveness.
>
>1.2 Changes from IKEv1
>
> 1) To define the entire protocol in a single document, rather than
> several that cross reference one another;
>
> 2) To simplify IKE by making phase 1 be a single exchange (based on
> public signature keys);
>
> 3) To decrease IKE's latency by making the initial exchange be 2
> round trips (4 messages), and allowing the ability to piggyback setup
> of a Child-SA on that exchange;
>
> 4) To reduce the number of possible error states by making the
> protocol reliable (all messages are acknowledged) and sequenced. This
> allows shortening Phase 2 exchanges from 3 messages to 2;
>
> 5) To increase robustness by allowing the Responder, if under attack,
> to require return of a cookie before the Responder commits any state
> to the exchange;
>
> 6) To fix bugs such as the hash problem documented in [];
>
> 7) To avoid unnecessary exponential explosion of space in attribute
> negotiation, by allowing choices when multiple algorithms of one type
> (say, encryption) can work with any of a number of acceptable
> algorithms of another type (say, hash);
>
> 8) To simplify and clarify how shared state is maintained in the
> presence of network failures;
>
> and 11) To maintain existing syntax to the extent possible to make it
> likely that implementations of IKEv1 can be enhanced to support IKEv2
> with minimum effort.
>
>1.3 Requirements Terminology
>
> Keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT" and
> "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as described
> in [Bra97].
>
>
>2 Protocol Overview
>
>
> IKE runs over UDP port 500. Since UDP is a datagram (unreliable)
> protocol, IKE includes in its definition recovery from transmission
> errors, including packet loss, packet replay, and packet forgery. IKE
> is designed to function so long as at least one of a series of
> retransmitted packets reaches its destination before timing out and
> the channel is not so full of forged and replayed packets so as to
> exhaust the network or CPU capacities of either endpoint. Even in the
> absence of those minimum performance requirements, IKE is designed to
> fail cleanly (as though the network were broken).
>
>2.1 Use of Retransmission Timers
>
> All messages in IKE exist in pairs: a request and a response. Either
> end of a security association may initiate requests at any time, and
> there can be many requests and responses "in flight" at any given
> moment. But each message is labelled as either a request or a
> response and for each pair one end of the security association is the
> Initiator and the other is the Responder.
>
> For every pair of messages, the Initiator is responsible for
> retransmission in the event of a timeout. The Responder will never
> retransmit a response unless it receives a retransmission of the
> request. In that event, the Responder MUST either ignore the
> retransmitted request except insofar as it triggers a retransmission
> of the response OR if the request is idempotent, the Responder may
> choose to process the request again and send a semantically
> equivalent reply.
>
> IKE is a reliable protocol, in the sense that the Initiator MUST
> retransmit a request until either it receives a corresponding reply
> OR it deems the IKE security association to have failed and it
> discards all state associated with the IKE-SA and any Child-SAs
> negotiated using that IKE-SA.
>
>2.2 Use of Sequence Numbers for Message ID
>
> Every IKE message contains a Message ID as part of its fixed header.
> This Message ID is used to match up requests and responses, and to
> identify retransmissions of messages.
>
> The Message ID is a 32 bit quantity, with is zero for the first IKE
> message. Each endpoint in the IKE Security Association maintains two
> "current" Message IDs: the next one to be used for a request it
> initiates and the next one it expects to see from the other end.
> These counters increment as requests are generated and received.
> Responses always contain the same message ID as the corresponding
> request. That means that after the initial setup, each integer n will
> appear as the message ID in four distinct messages: The nth request
> from the original IKE Initiator, the corresponding response, the nth
> request from the original IKE Responder, and the corresponding
> response. If the two ends make very different numbers of requests,
> the Message IDs in the two directions can be very different. There is
> no ambiguity in the messages, however, because each packet contains
> enough information to determine which of the four messages a
> particular one is.
>
> In the case where the IKE_SA_init is rejected (e.g. in order to
> require a cookie), the second IKE_SA_init message will begin the
> sequence over with Message #0.
>
>2.3 Window Size for overlapping requests
>
> In order to maximize IKE throughput, an IKE endpoint MAY issue
> multiple requests before getting a response to any of them. For
> simplicity, an IKE implementation MAY choose to process requests
> strictly in order and/or wait for a response to one request before
> issuing another. Certain rules must be followed to assure
> interoperability between implementations using different strategies.
>
> After an IKE-SA is set up, either end can initiate one or more
> requests. These requests may pass one another over the network. An
> IKE endpoint MUST be prepared to accept and process a request while
> it has a request outstanding in order to avoid a deadlock in this
> situation. An IKE endpoint SHOULD be prepared to accept and process
> multiple requests while it has a request outstanding.
By processing, do you mean the end-point should be able to buffer
the data.
>
> An IKE endpoint MUST NOT have a window size for transmitted IKE
> requests of more than 10. In other words, when it needs to make a
> request n, it MUST wait until it has received responses to all
> requests up through request n-10. An IKE endpoint MUST keep a copy of
> (or be able to regenerate exactly) each request it has sent until it
> receives the corresponding response. An IKE endpoint MUST keep a copy
> of (or be able to regenerate with semantic equivalence) its previous
> 10 responses in case its response was lost and the Initiator requests
> its retransmission by retransmitting the request.
>
> The simplest compliant IKE implementation will wait for a response to
> each request before sending the next request, but will process
> incoming requests while its request is outstanding. It MAY also
> process incoming requests only in order. If a request comes in with
> an unexpected sequence number, it MAY be discarded. The Initiator
> will eventually resend the original lost requests and all the
> requests that followed it.
>
> An IKE endpoint SHOULD be capable of processing incoming requests out
> of order to maximize performance in the event of network failures or
> packet reordering.
>
>2.4 State Synchronization and Connection Timeouts
>
> An IKE endpoint is allowed to forget all of its state associated with
> an IKE-SA and the collection of corresponding child-SAs at any time.
> This is the anticipated behavior in the event of an endpoint crash
> and restart. It is important when an endpoint either fails or
> reinitializes its state that the other endpoint detect those
> conditions and not continue to waste network bandwidth by sending
> packets over those SAs and having them fall into a black hole.
>
> Since IKE is designed to operate in spite of Denial of Service (DoS)
> attacks from the network, an endpoint MUST NOT conclude that the
> other endpoint has failed based on any routing information (e.g. ICMP
> messages) or IKE messages that arrive without cryptographic
> protection (e.g., notify messages complaining about unknown SPIs). An
> endpoint MUST conclude that the other endpoint has failed only when
> repeated attempts to contact it have gone unanswered for a timeout
> period. An endpoint SHOULD suspect that the other endpoint has failed
> based on routing information and initiate a request to see whether
> the other endpoint is alive. To check whether the other side is
> alive, IKE provides a null query notify message that requires an
> acknowledgment. If a cryptographically protected message has been
> received from the other side recently, unprotected notifications MAY
> be ignored. Implementations MUST limit the rate at which they
> generate responses to unprotected messages.
>
> Numbers of retries and lengths of timeouts are not covered in this
> specification because they do not affect interoperability. It is
> suggested that messages be retransmitted at least a dozen times over
> a period of at least several minutes before giving up on an SA, but
> different environments may require different rules.
>
> Note that with these rules, there is no reason to negotiate and agree
> upon an SA lifetime. If IKE presumes the partner is dead, based on
> repeated lack of acknowledgment to an IKE message, then the IKE SA
> and all SAs set up through that IKE-SA are deleted.
>
> An IKE endpoint MAY delete inactive Child-SAs to recover resources
> used to hold their state. If an IKE endpoint chooses to do so, it
> MUST send Delete payloads to the other end notifying it of the
> deletion. It MAY similarly time out the IKE-SA. Closing the IKE-SA
> implicitly closes all associated Child-SAs. An IKE endpoint SHOULD
> send a Delete payload indicating that it has closed the IKE-SA.
>
> One last instance in which an SA might be deleted is by the
> Responder, in the case where no IKE-auth message arrives from the
> Initiator within a timeout period. This would occur if the Initiator
> has crashed after sending the IKE-SA-init, or if the IKE-SA-init is
> actually a denial of service message sent from an attacker.
>
>2.5 Version Numbers and Forward Compatibility
>
> This document describes version 2.0 of IKE, meaning the major version
> number is 2 and the minor version number is zero. It is likely that
> some implementations will want to support both version 1.0 and
> version 2.0, and in the future, other versions.
>
> The major version number should only be incremented if the packet
> formats have changed so dramatically that an older version node would
> not be able to interoperate with messages in the new version format.
> The minor version number indicates new capabilities, and MUST be
> ignored by a node with a smaller minor version number, but used for
> informational purposes by the node with the larger minor version
> number. For example, it might indicate the ability to process a newly
> defined notification message. The node with the larger minor version
> number would simply note that its correspondent would not be able to
> understand that message and therefore would not send it.
>
> If you receive a message with a higher major version number, you MUST
> drop the message and SHOULD send an unauthenticated notification
> message containing the highest version number you support. If you
> support major version n, and major version m, you MUST support all
> versions between n and m. If you receive a message with a major
> version that you support, you MUST respond with that version number.
> In order to prevent two nodes from being tricked into corresponding
> with a lower major version number than the maximum that they both
> support, IKE has a flag that indicates that the node is capable of
> speaking a higher major version number.
>
> Thus the major version number in the IKE header indicates the version
> number of the message, not the highest version number that the
> transmitter supports. If A is capable of speaking versions n, n+1,
> and n+2, and B is capable of speaking versions n and n+1, then they
> will negotiate speaking n+1, where A will set the flag indicating
> ability to speak a higher version. If they mistakenly (perhaps
> through an active attacker sending error messages) negotiate to
> version n, then both will notice that the other side can support a
> higher version number, and they MUST break the connection and
> reconnect using version n+1.
>
> Note that v1 does not follow these rules, because there is no way in
> v1 of noting that you are capable of speaking a higher version
> number. So an active attacker can trick two v2-capable nodes into
> speaking v1. Given the design of v1, there is no way of preventing
> this, but this version number discipline will prevent such problems
> in future versions.
>
> Also for forward compatibility, all fields marked RESERVED MUST be
> set to zero by a version 2.0 implementation and their content MUST be
> ignored by a version 2.0 implementation ("Be conservative in what you
> send and liberal in what you receive"). In this way, future versions
> of the protocol can use those fields in a way that is guaranteed to
> be ignored by implementations that do not understand them.
> Similarly, field types that are not defined are reserved for future
> use and implementations of version 2.0 MUST skip over those fields
> and ignore their contents.
>
> IKEv2 adds a "critical" flag to each payload header for further
> flexibility for forward compatibility. If the critical flag is set
> and the payload type is unsupported, the message MUST be rejected and
> the response to the IKE request containing that payload MUST include
> a notify payload INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE, indicating an unsupported
> critical payload was included. If the critical flag is not set and
> the payload type is unsupported, that payload is simply skipped.
>
>2.6 Cookies
>
> The term "cookies" originates with Karn and Simpson [RFC 2522] in
> Photurus, an early proposal for IKE/IPsec. It has persisted because
> the IETF has never rejected an offer involving cookies. In IKEv2,
> the cookies serve two purposes. First, they are used as IKE-SA
> identifiers in the headers of IKE messages. As with ESP and AH, in
> IKEv2 the recipient of a message chooses an IKE-SA identifier that
> uniquely defines that SA to that recipient. For this purpose (IKE-SA
> identifiers), it might be convenient for the cookie value to be
> chosen so as to be a table index for fast lookups of SAs. But this
> conflicts with the second purpose of the cookies (to be explained
> shortly).
>
> Unlike ESP and AH where only the recipient's SA identifier appears in
> the message, in IKE, the sender's IKE SA identifier is also sent in
> every message. In IKEv1 the IKE-SA identifier consisted of the pair
> (Initiator cookie, Responder cookie), whereas in IKEv2, the SA is
> uniquely defined by the recipient's SA identifier even though both
> are included in the IKEv2 header.
>
> The second use of cookies in IKEv2 is for a limited protection from
> denial of service attacks. Receipt of a request to start an SA can
> consume substantial resources. A likely denial of service attack
> against IKE is to overwhelm a system with large numbers of SA
> requests from forged IP addresses. This can consume CPU resources
> doing the crypto, and memory resources remembering the state of the
> "half open" connections until they time out. A robust design would
> limit the resources it is willing to devote to new connection
> establishment, but even so the denial of service attack could
> effectively prevent any new connections.
>
> This attack can be rendered more difficult by requiring that the
> Responder to an SA request do minimal computation and allocate no
> memory until the Initiator has proven that it can receive messages at
> the address it claims to be sending from. This is done in a stateless
> way by computing the cookie in a way that the Responder can recompute
> the same value, but the Initiator can't guess it. A recommended
> strategy is to compute the cookie as a cryptographic hash of the
> Initiator's IP address, the Initiator's cookie value (its chosen IKE
> security identifier), and a secret known only to the Responder. That
> secret should be changed periodically to prevent the "cookie jar"
> attack where an attacker accumulates lots of cookies from lots of IP
> addresses over time and then replays them all at once to overwhelm
> the Responder.
>
> In ISAKMP and IKEv1, the term cookie was used for the connection
> identifier, but the protocol did not permit their use against this
> particular denial of service attack. To avoid the cookie exchange
> adding extra messages to the protocol in the common case where the
> Responder is not under attack, IKEv2 goes back to the approach in
> Oakley (RFC 2412) where the cookie challenge is optional. Upon
> receipt of an IKE_SA_init, a Responder may either proceed with
> setting up the SA or may tell the Initiator to send another
> IKE_SA_init, this time providing a supplied cookie.
>
> It may be convenient for the IKE-SA identifier to be in index into a
> table rather than a number that must be looked up. It is not
> difficult for the Initiator to choose an IKE-SA identifier that is
> convenient as a table identifier, since the Initiator does not need
> to use it as an anti-clogging token, and is keeping state. IKEv2
> allows the Responder to initially choose a stateless anti-clogging
> type cookie by responding to an IKE_SA_init with a cookie request,
> and then upon receipt of an IKE_SA_init with a valid cookie, change
> his cookie value from the computed anti-clogging token to a more
> convenient value, by sending a different value for his cookie in the
> IKE_SA_init_response. This will not confuse the Initiator (Alice),
> because she will have chosen a unique cookie value A, so if her SA
> state for the partially set up IKE-SA says that Bob's cookie for the
> SA that Alice knows as "A" is B, and she receives a response from Bob
> with cookies (A,C), that means that Bob wants to change his value
> from B to C for the SA that Alice knows uniquely as "A".
>
> Another reason why Bob might want to change his cookie value is that
> it is possible (though unlikely) that Bob will choose the same cookie
> for multiple SAs if the hash of the Initiator cookie, Initiator IP
> address, and whatever other information might be included happens to
> hash to the same value.
>
> In IKEv2, like IKEv1, both 8-byte cookies appear in the message, but
> in IKEv2 (unlike v1), the value chosen by the message recipient
> always appears first in the message. This change eliminates a flaw in
> IKEv1, as well as having other advantages (allowing the recipient to
> look up the SA based on a small, conveniently chosen value rather
> than a 16-byte pseudorandom value.)
>
> The flaw in IKEv1 is that it was possible (though unlikely) for two
> connections to have the same set of cookies. For instance, if Alice
> chose A as the Initiator cookie when initiating a connection to Bob,
> she might subsequently receive a connection request from Carol, and
> Carol might also have chosen A as the Initiator cookie. Whatever
> value Alice responds to Carol, say B, might be selected as the
> Responder cookie by Bob for the Alice-Bob SA. Then Alice would be
> involved in two IKE sessions, both of which had Initiator cookie=A
> and Responder cookie=B. To minimize, but not eliminate, the
> probability of this happening, version 1 IKE recommended that cookies
> be chosen at random.
>
> One additional rule in IKEv2 is that the two cookie values have to be
> different. The Responder is responsible for choosing a value
> different from the one chosen by the Initiator. If the Responder's
> stateless cookie happens to be equal to the Initiator's cookie, that
> is legal provided that the Responder change his cookie value to
> something different from the Initiator's in his IKE_SA_init_response.
> The reason the cookies must be different in the two directions is to
> prevent reflection attacks. Another way reflection attacks could have
> been avoided was to compute different integrity and encryption keys
> in the two directions, but that would be another change from IKEv1.
>
> The cookies are one of the inputs into the function that computes the
> keying material. If the Responder initially sends a stateless cookie
> value in its IKE_SA_init_reject, and changes to a different value
> when it sends its IKE_SA_init_response, it is the cookie value in the
> IKE_SA_init_response that is the input for generating the keying
> material.
>
>2.7 Cryptographic Negotiation
>
> The payload type known as "SA" indicates a proposal for a set of
> choices of protocols (e.g., IKE, ESP, AH, and/or IPcomp) for the SA
> as well as cryptographic algorithms associated with each protocol. In
> IKEv1 it was extremely complex, and required a separate proposal for
> each possible combination. If there were n algorithms of one type
> (say encryption) that were acceptable and worked with any one of m
> algorithms of another type (say integrity protection), then it would
> take space proportional to n*m to express all of the possibilities.
>
> IKEv2 has simplified the format of the SA payload somewhat, but in
> addition to simplifying the format, solves the exponential explosion
> by allowing, within a proposal, multiple algorithms of the same type.
> If more than one algorithm of the same type (say encryption) appears
> in a proposal, that means that the sender of that SA proposal is
> willing to accept the proposal with any of those choices, and the
> recipient when it accepts the proposal selects exactly one of each of
> the types of algorithms from the choices offered within that
> proposal.
>
> An SA consists of one or more proposals. Each proposal has a number
> (so that the recipient can specify which proposal has been accepted),
> and contains a protocol (IKE, ESP, AH, or IPcomp), an SPI to be used
> by ESP or AH or IPcomp, and set of transforms. Each transform
> consists of a type (e.g., encryption, integrity protection,
> authentication, Diffie-Hellman group, compression) and a transform ID
> (e.g., DES, IDEA, HMAC-MD5). To negotiate an SA that does ESP,
> IPcomp, and AH, the SA will contain three proposals with the same
> proposal number, one proposing ESP, a 4 byte SPI to be used with ESP,
> and a set of transforms; one proposing AH, a 4-byte SPI to be used
> with AH, and a set of transforms; and one proposing IPcomp, a 2-byte
> SPI to be used with IPcomp, and a set of transforms. If the recipient
> selects that proposal number, it means the SA will do all of ESP, AH,
> and IPcomp.
>
> In IKEv2, since the Initiator sends her Diffie-Hellman value in the
> IKE_SA_init, she must guess at the Diffie-Hellman group that Bob will
> select from her list. If the one she guesses is not the one Bob would
> have chosen, then Bob's response informs her of the group he would
> choose, and notifies her that her Diffie-Hellman value is invalid
> because it does not match the chosen group. In this case Alice will
> send a new IKE_SA_init, with the same original choices in the same
> priority order as in her original IKE_SA_init. (This is important to
> prevent an active attacker from tricking them into using a weaker
> group than they would have agreed upon.)
>
> If none of Alice's options are acceptable, then Bob notifies her
> accordingly.
>
>2.8 Rekeying
>
> Security associations negotiated in both phase 1 and phase 2 contain
> secret keys which may only be used for a limited amount of time. This
> determines the lifetime of the entire security association. When the
> lifetime of a security association expires the security association
> MUST NOT be used. If there is demand, new security associations can
> be established. Reestablishment of security associations to take the
> place of ones which expire is referred to as "rekeying".
>
> To rekey a child-SA, open a new, equivalent SA, and when the new one
> is established, delete the old one. To rekey an IKE-SA, establish a
> new equivalent IKE-SA, establish new, equivalent child-SAs for all
> the child-SAs of the original IKE-SA, and then delete the old IKE-SA,
> which will automatically cause deletion of all the old IKE-SA's child
> SAs.
The above implies that IKE V2 mandates no dangling ipsec SAs.
This is a big change and should be called out explicitly in the
differences section.
>
> SAs SHOULD be rekeyed proactively, i.e., the new SA should be
> established before the old one expires and becomes unusable. Enough
> time should elapse between the time the new SA is established and the
> old one becomes unusable so that traffic can be switched over to the
> new SA.
>
> A difference between IKEv1 and IKEv2 is that in IKEv1 SA lifetimes
> were negotiated. In IKEv2, each end of the SA is responsible for
> enforcing its own lifetime policy on the SA and rekeying the SA when
> necessary. If the two ends have different lifetime policies, the end
> with the shorter lifetime will end up always being the one to request
> the rekeying.
>
> This form of rekeying will temporarily result in multiple similar SAs
> between the same pairs of nodes. When there are two SAs eligible to
> receive packets, a node MUST accept incoming packets through either
> SA. The node that initiated the rekeying SHOULD delete the older SA
> after the new one is established.
>
There is some ambiguity here. Would it be better to state that the node
that initiated the rekeying start using the new SA right away right
after rekeying even if the older SA has not expired? It may be necessary
to keep the older SA till their lifetime expires to receive inbound
packets on that SA.
>2.9 Traffic Restriction Negotiation
>
> When a child-SA is established, IKE negotiates the type of traffic to
> be sent across that SA. This is done in the payload type TR (Traffic
> Restriction). In the child-create request message, the Initiator
> offers a description of the traffic to be sent across that SA. This
> consists of a set of IP ranges and ports for the source of packets,
> and a set of IP ranges and ports for the destination of packets.
> "Source" of packets is defined from the point of view of the
> Initiator, so the Initiator of the child-SA specifies in the TRs
> (traffic restriction-source) a description of sources of packets it
> will forward across the SA, and in the TRd (traffic restriction-
> destination) a description of destinations of packets it will forward
> across the SA.
>
> A missing TR payload indicates no restriction. So for instance, if
> TRs indicates IP address subnet 17.23.52.* and TRd is missing, it
> means the initiator is proposing that traffic sources be within the
> 17.23.52.* subnet, and destinations can be anything.
>
Wildcarding is a powerful feature. Are there any security implications?
Also if sender is not sending TRd to specify that the destination can
be anything, is the responder allowed to narrow down the choice
by specifying a TRr record?
> The Responder is allowed to narrow the choices by selecting a subset
> of the traffic, for instance by eliminating some address or port
> ranges from sources and/or destinations, or by narrowing any of the
> offered ranges. Because RFC 2401 also allows the policy that an SA
> must only have a single IP address pair, and since the Responder
> can't guess which IP address pair will be needed, the Responder might
> also respond with a notify payload in the response indicating traffic
> description unacceptable, single pair required.
Does it mean IkeV2 will be in violation of RFC2401?
>
> Note that the traffic restriction applies to both child-SAs (from the
> Initiator to the Responder and from the Responder to the Initiator),
> but the Responder does not change the order of the TR payloads, and
> what the Responder refers to as TRs is still from the point of view
> of the Initiator. An address within the restriction of TRs would
> appear as a source address in the child-SA from the Initiator, and
> would appear as a destination address in traffic on the child-SA to
> the Initiator (from the Responder).
>
> IKEv2 is more flexible than IKEv1. IKEv2 allows sets of ranges of
> both addresses and ports, and allows the Responder to choose a subset
> of the requested traffic rather than simply responding "not
> acceptable".
Bit confusing. On one hand IKEV2 allows a rich variety of targets to
be specified, but requires narrowing down only from the specified set
of target without any modifications. That implies the sender has to
list all possible combinations.
Also, if we allow wildcarding then why not allow a opaque
policy id understood to ipsec peers in the TR payload. That would
provide the max. flexiblity in terms of ipsec proxy addressing.
>
>2.10 Nonces
>
> The IKE_SA_init_request and the IKE_SA_init_response each contain a
> nonce. The nonce value MUST be unique (not reused in subsequent
> connections with the same Diffie-Hellman values). It need not be
> random or unpredictable. However, an easy method of making it unique
> is to choose nonce values at random.
>
> The child-create request and the child-create response also each
> contain a nonce. Again, the nonce value MUST be unique, but need not
> be unpredictable or random. However, for child-SA's the two nonces
> MUST be different, since otherwise the keys might be the same in the
> two directions.
>
>3 The Phase 1 Exchange
>
> The base Phase 1 exchange is a four message exchange (two
> request/response pairs). The first pair of messages, the IKE_SA_init
> exchange, negotiate cryptographic algorithms, indicate trusted CA
> names, exchange nonces, and do a Diffie-Hellman exchange. This pair
> might be repeated if the response indicates that none of the
> cryptographic proposals are acceptable, or the Diffie-Hellman group
> chosen by the Initiator for sending her Diffie-Hellman value is not
> the group that the Responder would have chosen, of if the Responder
> is under attack and will only answer IKE_SA_init requests containing
> a valid returned cookie value.
>
> The second pair of messages, the IKE_auth and the IKE_auth_response,
> authenticate the previous messages, exchange identities and
> certificates, and optionally also establish a child_SA. This pair of
> messages is encrypted with a key established through the IKE_SA_init
> exchange, so the identities are hidden from eavesdroppers.
>
> The shared secret information is computed as follows. A quantity
> called SKEYSEED is calculated from the nonces exchanged during the
> IKE_SA_init exchange, and the Diffie-Hellman shared secret
> established during that exchange. SKEYSEED is used to calculate
> three other secrets: SKEYSEED_d used for deriving new keys for the
> child-SAs established with this IKE-SA; SKEYSEED_a used for
> authenticating the component messages of subsequent exchanges; and
> SKEYSEED_e used for encrypting (and of course decrypting) all
> subsequent exchanges. SKEYSEED and its derivatives are computed as
> follows:
>
> SKEYSEED = prf(Ni_b | Nr_b, g^ir)
What is Ni_b?
> SKEYSEED_d = prf(SKEYSEED, g^ir | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0)
> SKEYSEED_a = prf(SKEYSEED, SKEYSEED_d | g^ir | CKY-I | CKY-R | 1)
> SKEYSEED_e = prf(SKEYSEED, SKEYSEED_a | g^ir | CKY-I | CKY-R | 2)
>
> CKY-I and CKY-R are the Initiator's and Responder's cookie,
> respectively, from the IKE header. g^ir is the shared secret from the
> ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. 0, 1, and 2 are represented by a
> single byte containing the value 0, 1, or 2 (the values, not the
> ASCII representation of the digits). prf is the "pseudo-random"
> cryptographic function negotiated in the IKE-SA-init exchange. The
> pseudo-random functions defined for IKE are HMAC_MD5 and HMAC_SHA,
> defined in RFC XXXX.
>
>
> In the following description, the payloads contained in the message
> are indicated by names such as SA. The details of the contents of
> each payload are described later. Payloads which may optionally
> appear will be shown in brackets, such as [CERTREQ], would indicate
> that optionally a certificate request payload can be included. The
> certificate request payload indicates a CA name trusted by the
> sender. If the sender trusts multiple CAs, it includes multiple
> CERTREQ payloads, one for each trusted CA.
>
> The Phase 1 exchange is as follows:
>
> Initiator Responder
> ----------- -----------
> HDR, SA, KE, Ni [,CERTREQ] -->
>
> The SA payload states the cryptographic algorithms the Initiator
> supports. The KE payload sends the Initiator's Diffie-Hellman value.
> Ni is the Initiator's nonce, sent in an N payload.
>
> <-- HDR, SA, KE, Nr [,CERTREQ]
>
HASH payloads are missing?
> The Responder chooses among the Initiator's cryptographic algorithms
> and expresses that choice in the SA payload, completes the Diffie-
> Hellman exchange with the KE payload, and sends its nonce in the N
> payload (with an "r" to signify the Responder's nonce).
>
> At this point in time each party generates SKEYSEED and its
> derivatives. The following two messages, the SA_auth and
> SA_auth_response, are encrypted (as indicated by the '*' following
> the IKE header) and the encryption bit in the IKE header is set.
>
> HDR*, ID, SIG [, CERT] [, SA, TRs, TRd]
> -->
>
> The Initiator identifies herself with the ID payload, authenticates
> herself to the Responder with the SIG payload, optionally sends one
> or more certificates, and optionally begins negotiation of a child-SA
> using the SA payload and the Traffic Restriction payloads: TRs (which
> describes sources of packets to be sent over the child-SA), and TRd
> (which describes destinations of packets to be sent over the child-
> SA). The protocol (ESP, AH, and/or IPcomp) and the SPI she wants to
> use to identify her inbound child-SA are placed in the "protocol" and
> "SPI" fields, respectively, in the SA payload.
>
>
> <-- HDR*, ID, SIG [, CERT]
> [, SA, TRs, TRd]
>
> The Responder identifies himself with an ID payload authenticates
> himself with the SIG payload, optionally sends a certificate, and
> completes negotiation of a child-SA using the SA payload. The
> Responder places the SPI he wants to use to identify his inbound
> child-SA in the SA payload. The TRs and TRd, respectively, describe
> the sources and destinations of packets to be sent over the child-SA.
> These MUST be equal to, or a subset of, the ones suggested by the
> Initiator.
>
>3.1 Authentication of the IKE-SA
>
> The peers are authenticated by having each sign the concatenation of
> the first two messages of the exchange. Optionally, they MAY include
> a certificate or certificate chain providing evidence that the public
> key they are using belongs to the name in the ID payload. The public
> key signature will be computed using algorithms chosen by the signer,
> most commonly an RSA-signed PKCS1-padded-SHA1-hash of the
> concatenated messages or a DSS-signed SHA1-hash of the concatenated
> messages. There is no requirement that the Initiator and Responder
> sign with the same cryptographic algorithms. The choice of
> cryptographic algorithms depends on the type of public key each has.
> This type is either indicated in the certificate supplied or, if the
> public keys were exchanged out of band, the key types must have been
> similarly learned.
The above description implies that IKEV2 has no need for
negotiating Authentication of type RSA signature/DSA signature
explicitly, yet in section 7.3.2 while describing the
transform attributes all the IKEV1 authentication values
seem to be supported.
If one side negotiates RSA signature based auth, can the
other side send a DSA cert.
>
>4 The CREATE-CHILD-SA (Phase 2) Exchange
>
> A phase 2 exchange is one request/response pair, and can be used to
> create or delete a child-SA, delete the IKE-SA, or deliver
> information such as error conditions. It is encrypted and integrity
> protected using the keys negotiated during the creation of the IKE-
> SA. The two directions of flow use the same keys.
>
> Messages are cryptographically protected using the cryptographic
> algorithms and keys negotiated in the first two messages of the IKE
> exchange using a syntax based on the encoding in ESP (see Appendix
> B). Encryption uses a key derived from SKEYSEED_e; Integrity uses a
> key derived from SKEYSEED_a.
>
> Either side may initiate a phase 2 exchange. A child-SA is created by
> sending a CREATE_CHILD_SA request. If PFS for the child-SA is
> desired, the CREAT_CHILD_SA request contains KE payloads for an
> additional Diffie-Hellman exchange. The keying material for the
> child_SA is a function of SKEYSEED_d established during the
> establishment of the IKE-SA, the nonces exchanged during the
> CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange, and the Diffie-Hellman value, if KE
> payloads are included in the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange. If the
> Diffie-Hellman group for the child-SA is desired to be different from
> the group for the IKE-SA, then a Diffie-Hellman group transform MUST
> be included in the SA payload. If it is absent, the Diffie-Hellman
> group is assumed to be the same as the one in the IKE-SA.
>
>
>
> The CREATE_CHILD_SA request contains:
>
> Initiator Responder
> ----------- -----------
> HDR*, SA, Ni [, KEi ]
> [, TRs] [, TRd] -->
>
> The Initiator sends SA offer(s) in the SA payload(s), a nonce in the
> Ni payload, optionally a Diffie-Hellman value in the KE payload, and
> the traffic restrictions in the TRs and TRd payloads. The message
> past the header is encrypted and the message including the header is
> integrity protected using the cryptographic algorithms negotiated in
> Phase 1.
>
> The CREATE_CHILD_SA response contains:
>
> <-- HDR*, SA, Nr
> [, KEr ] [, TRs] [,
> TRd]
>
> The Responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the
> accepted offer in an SA payload, optionally a Diffie-Hellman value in
> the KE payload, and the traffic restrictions for traffic to be sent
> on that SA in the TR payloads, which may be a subset of what the
> Initiator of the child-SA proposed.
>
>4.1 Generating Keying Material for Child-SAs
>
> Child-SAs are created either by being piggybacked on the phase 1
> exchange, or in a phase 2 CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange. Keying material
> for them is generated as follows:
>
> KEYMAT = prf(SKEYSEED_d, protocol | SPId | Ns | Nd )
>
> For phase 2 exchanges with PFS the keying material is defined as:
>
> KEYMAT = prf(SKEYSEED_d, g(p2)^ir | protocol | SPId | Ns | Nd )
>
> where g(p2)^ir is the shared secret from the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
> exchange of this phase 2 exchange.
>
> In either case, "protocol", and "SPI", are from the SA payload that
> contained the negotiated (and accepted) proposal, Ns is the body of
> the Source's nonce payload (minus the generic header), and Nr is the
> body of the Destination's nonce payload (minus the generic header).
>
> A single child-SA negotiation results in two security associations--
> one inbound and one outbound. Different Nonces and SPIs for each SA
> (one chosen by the Initiator, the other by the Responder) guarantee a
> different key for each direction. The SPI chosen by the destination
> of the SA and the Nonces (ordered source followed by destination) are
> used to derive KEYMAT for that SA.
>
> For situations where the amount of keying material desired is greater
> than that supplied by the prf, KEYMAT is expanded by feeding the
> results of the prf back into itself and concatenating results until
> the required keying material has been reached. In other words,
>
> KEYMAT = K1 | K2 | K3 | ...
> where:
> K1 = prf(SKEYSEED_d, [ g(p2)^ir | ] protocol | SPId | Ns | Nd)
> K2 = prf(SKEYSEED_d, K1 | [ g(p2)^ir | ] protocol | SPId | Ns | Nd)
> K3 = prf(SKEYSEED_d, K2 | [ g(p2)^ir | ] protocol | SPId | Ns | Nd)
> etc.
>
> This keying material (whether with PFS or without) MUST be used with
> the negotiated SA. In the case of an ESP SA needing two keys for
> encryption and authentication, the encryption key is taken from the
> first bytes of KEYMAT and the authentication key is taken from the
> next bytes.
>
>5 Informational (Phase 2) Exchange
>
> At various points during an IKE-SA, peers may desire to convey
> control messages to each other regarding errors or notifications of
> certain events. To accomplish this IKE defines a (reliable)
> Informational exchange. Usually Informational exchanges happen
> during phase 2 and are cryptographically protected with the IKE
> exchange.
>
> Control messages that pertain to an IKE-SA MUST be sent under that
> IKE-SA. Control messages that pertain to Child-SAs MUST be sent under
> the protection of the IKE-SA which generated them.
>
> There are two cases in which there is no IKE-SA to protect the
> information. One is in the response to an IKE_SA_init_request to
> request a cookie or to refuse the SA proposal. This would be conveyed
> in a Notify payload of the IKE_SA_init_response.
>
> The other case in which there is no IKE-SA to protect the information
> is when a packet is received with an unknown SPI. (XXXwhat happens
> if an ESP packet comes in with an unexpected source address, or
> cryptographically invalidXXX). In that case the notification of this
> condition will be sent in an informational exchange that is
> cryptographically unprotected.
>
> Messages in an Informational Exchange contain zero or more
> Notification or Delete payloads. The Recipient of an Informational
> Exchange request MUST send some response (else the Sender will assume
> the message was lost in the network and will retransmit it). That
> response can be a message with no payloads. Actually, the request
> message in an Informational Exchange can also contain no payloads.
> This is the expected way an endpoint can ask the other endpoint to
> verify that it is alive.
>
> ESP, AH, and IPcomp SAs always exist in pairs, with one SA in each
> direction. When an SA is closed, both members of the pair MUST be
> closed. When SAs are nested, as when data is encapsulated first with
> IPcomp, then with ESP, and finally with AH between the same pair of
> endpoints, all of the SAs (up to six) must be deleted together. To
> delete an SA, an Informational Exchange with one or more delete
> payloads is sent listing the SPIs (as known to the recipient) of the
> SAs to be deleted. The recipient MUST close the designated SAs.
> Normally, the reply in the Informational Exchange will contain delete
> payloads for the paired SAs going in the other direction. There is
> one exception. If by chance both ends of a set of SAs independently
> decide to close them, each may send a delete payload and the two
> requests may cross in the network. If a node receives a delete
> request for SAs that it has already issued a delete request for, it
> MUST delete the incoming SAs while processing the request and the
> outgoing SAs while processing the response. In that case, the
> responses MUST NOT include delete payloads for the deleted SAs, since
> that would result in duplicate deletion and could in theory delete
> the wrong SA.
>
> A node SHOULD regard half open connections as anomalous and audit
> their existence should they persist. Note that this specification
> nowhere specifies time periods, so it is up to individual endpoints
> to decide how long to wait. A node MAY refuse to accept incoming data
> on half open connections but MUST NOT unilaterally close them and
> reuse the SPIs. If connection state becomes sufficiently messed up, a
> node MAY close the IKE-SA which will implicitly close all SAs
> negotiated under it. It can then rebuild the SA's it needs on a clean
> base under a new IKE-SA.
>
> The Informational Exchange is defined as:
>
> Initiator Responder
> ----------- -----------
> HDR*, N, ..., D, ... -->
> <-- HDR*, N, ..., D, ...
detail what the payloads N and D mean.
>
> The processing of an Informational Exchange is determined by its
> component payloads.
>
>6 Error Handling
>
> There are many kinds of errors that can occur during IKE processing.
> If a request is received that is badly formatted or unacceptable for
> reasons of policy (e.g. no matching cryptographic algorithms), the
> response MUST contain a Notify payload indicating the error. If an
> error occurs outside the context of an IKE request (e.g. the node is
> getting ESP messages on a non-existent SPI), the node SHOULD initiate
> an Informational Exchange with a Notify payload describing the
> problem.
>
> Errors that occur before a cryptographically protected IKE-SA is
> established must be handled very carefully. There is a trade-off
> between wanting to be helpful in diagnosing a problem and responding
> to it and wanting to avoid being a dupe in a denial of service attack
> based on forged messages.
>
> If a node receives a message on UDP port 500 outside the context of
> an IKE-SA (and not a request to start one), it may be the result of a
> recent crash. If the message is marked as a response, the node MAY
> audit the suspicious event but MUST NOT respond. If the message is
> marked as a request, the node MAY audit the suspicious event and MAY
> send a response. If a response is sent, the response MUST be sent to
> the IP address from whence it came with the IKE cookies reversed in
> the header and the Message ID copied. The response MUST NOT be
> cryptographically protected and MUST contain a notify payload
> indicating the nature of the problem.
>
> A node receiving such a message MUST NOT respond and MUST NOT change
> the state of any existing SAs. The message might be a forgery or
> might be a response the genuine correspondent was tricked into
> sending. A node SHOULD treat such a message (and also a network
> message like ICMP destination unreachable) as a hint that there might
> be problems with SAs to that IP address and SHOULD initiate a
> liveness test for any such IKE-SA. An implementation SHOULD limit the
> frequency of such tests to avoid being tricked into participating in
> a denial of service attack.
>
> A node receiving a suspicious message from an IP address with which
> it has an IKE-SA MAY send an IKE notify payload in an IKE
> Informational exchange over that SA. The recipient MUST NOT change
> the state of any SA's as a result but SHOULD audit the event to aid
> in diagnosing malfunctions. A node MUST limit the rate at which it
> will send messages in response to unprotected messages.
It will also be useful to mandate the behavior for sending 'INVALID SPI'
messages. I feel a node receiving an invalid spi SHOULD sent a
notification (subject to rate limiting). This will help the sender
do liveliness check for an ipsec SA.
>7 Header and Payload Formats
>
>7.1 The IKE Header
>
> IKE messages use UDP port 500, with one IKE message per UDP datagram.
> Information from the UDP header is largely ignored except that the IP
> addresses from the headers are reversed and used for return packets.
> Each IKE message begins with the IKE header, denoted HDR in this
> memo. Following the header are one or more IKE payloads each
> identified by a "Next Payload" field in the preceding payload.
> Payloads are processed in the order in which they appear in an IKE
> message by invoking the appropriate processing routine according to
> the "Next Payload" field in the IKE header and subsequently according
> to the "Next Payload" field in the IKE payload itself until a "Next
> Payload" field of zero indicates that no payloads follow.
>
> The Recipient SPI in the header identifies an instance of an IKE
> security association. It is therefore possible for a single instance
> of IKE to multiplex distinct sessions with multiple peers.
>
> The format of the IKE header is shown in Figure X.
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Recipient !
> ! SPI (aka Cookie) !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Sender !
> ! SPI (aka Cookie) !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Next Payload ! MjVer ! MnVer ! Exchange Type ! Flags !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Message ID !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Length !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure X: IKE Header Format
>
> o Recipient SPI (aka Cookie) (8 bytes) - A value chosen by the
> recipient to identify a unique IKE security association.
> [NOTE: this is a deviation from ISAKMP and IKEv1, where the
> cookies were always sent with the Initiator of the IKE-SA's
> cookie first and the Responder's second. See section XXX.]
>
> o Sender SPI (aka Cookie) (8 bytes) - A value chosen by the
> sender to identify a unique IKE security association.
>
> o Next Payload (1 byte) - Indicates the type of payload that
> immediately follows the header. The format and value of each
> payload is defined below.
>
You may want to list the payload types and their assigned values
as in RFC2408.
> o Major Version (4 bits) - indicates the major version of the IKE
> protocol in use. Implementations based on this version of IKE
> MUST set the Major Version to 2. Implementations based on
> previous versions of IKE and ISAKMP MUST set the Major Version
> to 1. Implementations based on this version of IKE MUST reject
> (or ignore) messages containing a version number greater than
> 2.
>
> o Minor Version (4 bits) - indicates the minor version of the
> IKE protocol in use. Implementations based on this version of
> IKE MUST set the Minor Version to 0. They MUST ignore the minor
> version number of received messages.
>
> o Exchange Type (1 byte) - indicates the type of exchange being
> used. This dictates the payloads sent in each message and
> message orderings in the exchanges.
>
> Exchange Type Value
>
> RESERVED 0
> Informational 5
> Reserved for ISAKMP 1 - 4, 6 - 31
> Reserved for IKEv1 32 - 33
> IKE-SA-INIT 34
> IKE-AUTH 35
> CREATE-CHILD-SA 36
> Reserved for IKEv2+ 37-239
> Reserved for private use 240-255
>
> o Flags (1 byte) - indicates specific options that are set for
> the
> message. Presence of options are indicated by the appropriate
> bit
> in the flags field being set. The bits are defined LSB first,
> so
> bit 0 would be the least significant bit of the Flags byte.
>
> -- E(ncryption) (bit 0 of Flags) - If set, all payloads
> following the header are encrypted and integrity
> protected using the algorithms negotiated during
> session establishment and a key derived during the key
> exchange portion of IKE. If not set, the payloads are
> not protected. All payloads MUST be protected if a key
> has been negotiated and any unprotected payload may
> only be used to establish a new session or indicate a
> problem.
>
> -- C(ommit) (bit 1 of Flags) - This bit is defined by
> ISAKMP but not used by IKEv2. Implementations of IKEv2
> MUST clear this bit when sending and SHOULD ignore it
> in incoming messages.
>
> -- A(uthentication Only) (bit 2 of Flags) - This bit is
> defined by ISAKMP but not used by IKEv2. Implementations
> of IKEv2 MUST clear this bit when sending and SHOULD
> ignore it in incoming messages.
>
> -- I(nitiator) (bit 3 of Flags) - This bit MUST be set in
> messages sent by the Initiator of an exchange and MUST
> be cleared in messages sent by the Responder. It is
> used by the recipient to determine whether the message
> number should be interpreted in the context of its
> initiating state or its responding state.
>
> -- V(ersion) (bit 4 of Flags) - This bit indicates that
> the transmitter is capable of speaking a higher major
> version number of the protocol than the one indicated
> in the major version number field.
>
What is the usefulness of this flag?
Does it mean the transmitter always to start with IkeV1 and
then move upto IkeV2?
Also in IKEV1, this bit expected to be set to 0.
Then how can the sender who is setting the V1 in major number,
can indicate that he is capable of speaking a higher major version
number?
> -- R(eserved) (bits 5-7 of Flags) - These bit MUST be
> cleared in messages sent and received messages with
> these bits set MUST be rejected.
>
> o Message ID (4 bytes) - Message identifier used to control
> retransmission of lost packets and matching of requests and
> responses. See section 2.2. In the first message of a Phase 1
> negotiation, the value MUST be set to 0. The response to that
> message MUST also have a Message ID of 0.
>
> o Length (4 bytes) - Length of total message (header + payloads)
> in bytes. Session encryption can expand the size of an IKE
> message and that is reflected in the total length of the
> message.
>
>7.2 Generic Payload Header
>
> Each IKE payload defined in sections 7.3 through 7.13 begins with a
> generic header, shown in Figure 3. Figures for each payload below
> will include the generic payload header but for brevity a repeat of
> the description of each field will be omitted. The construction and
> processing of the generic payload header is identical for each
> payload and will similarly be omitted.
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Next Payload !C! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 3: Generic Payload Header
>
> The Generic Payload Header fields are defined as follows:
>
> o Next Payload (1 byte) - Identifier for the payload type of the
> next payload in the message. If the current payload is the last
> in the message, then this field will be 0. This field provides
> a "chaining" capability whereby additional payloads can be
> added to a message by appending it to the end of the message
> and setting the "Next Payload" field of the preceding payload
> to indicate the new payload's type.
>
> o Critical (1 bit) - MUST be set to zero if the sender wants
> the recipient to skip this payload if he does not
> understand the payload type code. MUST be set to one if the
> sender wants the recipient to reject this entire message
> if he does not understand this payload type. MUST be ignored
> by recipient if the recipient understands the payload type
> code. MUST be set to zero for payload types defined in this
> document. Note that the critical bit applies to the current
> payload rather than the "next" payload whose type code
> appears in the first byte.
>
> o RESERVED (7 bits) - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored.
>
> o Payload Length (2 bytes) - Length in bytes of the current
> payload, including the generic payload header.
>
Attribute payload information missing.
>7.3 Security Association Payload
>
> The Security Association Payload, denoted SA in this memo, is used to
> negotiate attributes of a security association. Assembly of Security
> Association Payloads requires great peace of mind. An SA may contain
> multiple proposals. Each proposal may contain multiple protocols
> (where a protocol is IKE, ESP, AH, or IPCOMP), each protocol may
> contain multiple transforms, and each transform may contain multiple
> attributes. When parsing an SA, an implementation MUST check that the
> total Payload Length is consistent with the payload's internal
> lengths and counts. Proposals, Transforms, and Attributes each have
> their own variable length encodings. They are nested such that the
> Payload Length of an SA includes the combined contents of the SA,
> Proposal, Transform, and Attribute information. The length of a
> Proposal includes the lengths of all Transforms and Attributes it
> contains. The length of a Transform includes the lengths of all
> Attributes it contains.
>
> The syntax of Security Associations, Proposals, Transforms, and
> Attributes is based on ISAKMP, however the semantics are somewhat
> different. The reason for the complexity and the hierarchy is to
> allow for multiple possible combinations of algorithms to be encoded
> in a single SA. Sometimes there is a choice of multiple algorithms,
> while other times there is a combination of algorithms. For example,
> an Initiator might want to propose using (AH w/MD5 and ESP w/3DES) OR
> (ESP w/MD5 and 3DES).
>
> One of the reasons the semantics of the SA payload has changed from
> ISAKMP and IKEv1 is to make the encodings more compact in common
> cases.
>
> The Proposal structure contains within it a Proposal # and a
> Protocol-id. Each structure MUST have the same Proposal # as the
> previous one or one greater. The first Proposal MUST have a Proposal
> # of one. If two successive structures have the same Proposal number,
> it means that the proposal consists of the first structure AND the
> second. So a proposal of AH AND ESP would have two proposal
> structures, one for AH and one for ESP and both would have Proposal
> #1. A proposal of AH OR ESP would have two proposal structures, one
> for AH with proposal #1 and one for ESP with proposal #2.
>
> Each Proposal/Protocol structure is followed by one or more transform
> structures. The number of different transforms is generally
> determined by the Protocol. AH generally has a single transform: an
> integrity check algorithm. ESP generally has two: an encryption
> algorithm AND an integrity check algorithm. IKE generally has four
> transforms: a Diffie-Hellman group, an authentication algorithm, an
> integrity check algorithm, and an encryption algorithm. For each
> Protocol, the set of permissible transforms are assigned transform ID
> numbers, which appear in the header of each transform.
>
> If there are multiple transforms with the same Transform #, the
> proposal is an OR of those transforms. If there are multiple
> Transforms with different Transform #s, the proposal is an AND of the
> different groups. For example, to propose ESP with (3DES or IDEA) and
> (HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA), the ESP proposal would contain two Transform
> #1 candidates (one for 3DES and one for IDEA) and two Transform #2
> candidates (one for HMAC-MD5 and one for HMAC-SHA). This effectively
> proposes four combinations of algorithms. If the Initiator wanted to
> propose only a subset of those - say (3DES and HMAC-MD5) or (IDEA and
> HMAC-SHA), there is no way to encode that as multiple transforms
> within a single Proposal/Protocol. Instead, the Initiator would have
> to construct two different Proposals, each with two transforms.
>
> A given transform MAY have one or more Attributes. Attributes are
> necessary when the transform can be used in more than one way, as
> when an encryption algorithm has a variable key size. The transform
> would specify the algorithm and the attribute would specify the key
> size. Most transforms do not have attributes.
>
> Note that the semantics of Transforms and Attributes are quite
> different than in IKEv1. In IKEv1, a single Transform carried
> multiple algorithms for a protocol with one carried in the Transform
> and the others carried in the Attributes.
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Domain of Interpretation (1) !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Situation (1) !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ <Proposals> ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 5: Security Association Payload
>
>
> o Domain of Interpretation (4 bytes) - MUST contain the integer
> value 1, indicating IPsec. Other values are reserved for
> related protocols. An implementation of IKEv2 MUST supply a
> value of 1, and MUST reject any SA payload containing any other
> value.
>
> o Situation (4 bytes) - a four byte bitmask where for IKEv2
> the low order bit MUST be set ON and all other bits MUST be
> set off. An implementation of IKEv2 MUST reject any SA payload
> containing any value other than 1.
>
> *NOTE*: removed the SIT_SECRECY and SIT_INTEGRITY options. If
> needed, we could put them back.
>
>7.3.1 Proposal Substructure
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! 0 (last) or 2 ! RESERVED ! Proposal Length !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Proposal # ! Protocol-Id ! SPI Size !# of Transforms!
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ~ SPI (variable) ~
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Transforms ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure XXX: Proposal Substructure
>
> o 0 (last) or 2 (more) (1 byte) - Specifies whether this is the
> last Proposal Substructure in the SA. This syntax is inherited
> from ISAKMP, but is unnecessary because the last Proposal
> could be identified from the length of the SA. The value (2)
> corresponds to a Payload Type of Proposal, and the first
> four bytes of the Proposal structure are designed to look
> somewhat like the header of a Payload.
>
> o RESERVED (1 byte) - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored.
>
> o Proposal Length (2 bytes) - Length of this proposal,
> including all transforms and attributes that follow.
>
> o Proposal # (1 byte) - When a proposal is made, the first
> proposal in an SA MUST be #1, and subsequent proposals
> MUST either be the same as the previous proposal (indicating
> an AND of the two proposals) or one more than the previous
> proposal (indicating an OR of the two proposals). When a
> proposal is accepted, all of the proposal numbers in the
> SA must be the same and must match the number on the
> proposal sent that was accepted.
>
> o Protocol-Id (1 byte) - Specifies the protocol identifier
> for the current negotiation. During phase 1 negotiation
> this field MUST be zero (0). During phase 2 it will be the
> protocol of the SA being established as assigned by IANA,
> for example, 50 for ESP, 51 for AH, and 108 for IPComp.
>
> o SPI Size (1 byte) - During phase 1 negotiation this field
> MUST be zero. During phase 2 negotiation it is equal to the
> size, in bytes, of the SPI of the corresponding protocol
> (4 for ESP and AH, 2 for IPcomp).
>
> o # of Transforms (1 byte) - Specifies the number of
> transforms for this proposal (the total number, not the
> highest transform #).
>
> o SPI (variable) - The sending entity's SPI. Even if the SPI
> Size is not a multiple of 4 bytes, there is no padding
> applied to the payload. When the SPI Size field is zero,
> this field is not present in the Security Association
> payload. This case occurs when negotiating the IKE-SA.
>
> o Proposal # (1 byte) - Identifies the immediate proposal. The
> first proposal has the number of one (1) and each subsequent
> proposal has a number which is one greater than the last.
>
> o Proposal Length (2 bytes) - Length in bytes of the proposal
> including all SA Attributes.
>
> o SA Attributes (variable length) - This field contains SA
> attributes for the immediate transform. The SA Attributes
> MUST be represented using the Transform Attributes format
> described below.
>
> o RESERVED (1 byte) - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored.
>
>7.3.2 Transform Substructure
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! 0 (last) or 3 ! RESERVED ! Transform Length !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Transform # ! Transform-Id ! RESERVED2 !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Transform Attributes ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 5: Transform Substructure
>
> o 0 (last) or 3 (more) (1 byte) - Specifies whether this is the
> last Transform Substructure in the Proposal. This syntax is
> inherited from ISAKMP, but is unnecessary because the last
> Proposal could be identified from the length of the SA. The
> value (3) corresponds to a Payload Type of Transform, and
> the first four bytes of the Transform structure are designed
> to look somewhat like the header of a Payload.
>
> o RESERVED (1 byte) - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored.
>
> o Transform Length - The length (in bytes) of the Transform
> Substructure including Header and Attributes.
>
> o Transform # (1 byte) - The type of transform being specified
> in this transform. Different protocols support different
> transform types. For some protocols, some of the transforms
> may be optional.
>
> Transform Number Values
>
> - Algorithm for: Trans# Used In
> Encryption 1 (IKE and ESP)
> Pseudo-random Function 2 (IKE, AH, and optional in ESP)
> Authentication 3 (IKE)
> Diffie-Hellman Group 4 (IKE and optional in AH and ESP)
> Compression 5 (IPcomp)
>
> values 6-240 are reserved to IANA. Values 241-255 are for
> private use among mutually consenting parties.
>
> For Transform #1 (Encryption), defined Transform-IDs are:
> RESERVED 0
> ENCR_DES_IV64 1
> ENCR_DES 2
> ENCR_3DES 3
> ENCR_RC5 4
> ENCR_IDEA 5
> ENCR_CAST 6
> ENCR_BLOWFISH 7
> ENCR_3IDEA 8
> ENCR_DES_IV32 9
> ENCR_RC4 10
> ENCR_NULL 11
AES is missing. It already has been assigned a number - right?
>
> values 12-240 are reserved to IANA. Values 241-255 are for
> private use among mutually consenting parties.
>
> For Transform #2 (Pseudo-random Function), defined Transform-IDs are:
>
> RESERVED 0
> PRF_HMAC_MD5 1
> PRF_HMAC_SHA 2
> PRF_DES_MAC 3
> PRF_KPDK_MD5 4
>
> values 5-240 are reserved to IANA. Values 241-255 are for
> private use among mutually consenting parties.
>
> For Transform #3 (Authentication), defined Transform-IDs are:
>
> RESERVED 0
> Methods in IKEv1 1 - 5
> Signed Diffie-Hellman 6
>
> values 7-240 are reserved to IANA. Values 241-255 are for
> private use among mutually consenting parties.
>
> For Transform #4 (Diffie-Hellman Group), defined Transform-IDs are:
>
> RESERVED 0
> Pre-defined (see section XXX) 1 - 5
> RESERVED 6 - 100
> MODP (exponentiation) 101 (w/attributes)
> ECP (elliptic curve over GF[P] 102 (w/attributes)
> EC2N (elliptic curve over GF[2^N]) 103 (w/attributes)
>
> values 6-100 and 104-240 are reserved to IANA. Values 241-255
> are for private use among mutually consenting parties.
>
>
> For Transform #5 (Compression), defined Transform-IDs are:
>
> RESERVED 0
> IPCOMP_OUI 1 (w/attributes)
> IPCOMP_DEFLATE 2
> IPCOMP_LZS 3
>
> values 4-240 are reserved to IANA. Values 241-255 are for
> private use among mutually consenting parties.
>
>7.3.3 Transform Attributes
>
> Each transform in a Security Association payload may include
> attributes that modify or complete the specification of the
> transform. These attributes are type/value pairs. (For example, if an
> encryption algorithm has a variable length key, the key length to be
> used may be specified as an attribute. Attributes can have a value
> with a fixed two byte length or a variable length value. For the
> latter the attribute is the form of type/length/value.
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> !A! Attribute Type ! AF=0 Attribute Length !
> !F! ! AF=1 Attribute Value !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! AF=0 Attribute Value .
> ! AF=1 Not Transmitted .
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 4: Data Attributes
>
> o Attribute Type (2 bytes) - Unique identifier for each type of
> attribute. The identifiers for IKE are defined in section X.Y.
>
> The most significant bit of this field is the Attribute Format
> bit (AF). It indicates whether the data attributes follow the
> Type/Length/Value (TLV) format or a shortened Type/Value (TV)
> format. If the AF bit is zero (0), then the Data Attributes
> are of the Type/Length/Value (TLV) form. If the AF bit is a
> one (1), then the Data Attributes are of the Type/Value form.
>
> o Attribute Length (2 bytes) - Length in bytes of the Attribute
> Value. When the AF bit is a one (1), the Attribute Value is
> only 2 bytes and the Attribute Length field is not present.
>
> o Attribute Value (variable length) - Value of the Attribute
> associated with the Attribute Type. If the AF bit is a
> zero (0), this field has a variable length defined by the
> Attribute Length field. If the AF bit is a one (1), the
> Attribute Value has a length of 2 bytes.
>
>7.3.4 Attribute Negotiation
>
> During security association negotiation Initiators present offers, in
> the form of protection suites, to Responders. Responders MUST select
> a single complete set of parameters from the offers (or reject the
> offers if none are acceptable). If there are multiple proposals, the
> Responder MUST choose a single proposal and return all of the
> Proposal substructures with that proposal number. For each protocol
> in the accepted offer, the Responder MUST choose a single transform
> of each transform type. Any attributes of a selected transform MUST
> be returned unmodified. The Initiator of an exchange MUST check that
> the accepted offer is consistent with one of its proposals, and if
> not that response MUST be rejected.
>
> Negotiating Diffie-Hellman groups presents some special challenges.
> Diffie-Hellman groups are specified either using a defined group
> description (section 5) or by defining all attributes of a group (see
> Appendix A) in an IKE policy offer. Group attributes, such as group
> type or prime number MUST NOT be offered in conjunction with a
> previously defined group. SA offers include proposed attributes and a
> Diffie-Hellman public number (KE) in the same message. If the
> Initiator offers to use one of several Diffie-Hellman groups, it
> SHOULD pick the one the Responder is most likely to accept and
> include a KE corresponding to that group. If the guess turns out to
> be wrong, the Responder will indicate the correct group in the
> response and the Initiator SHOULD start over this time guessing a
> different group. The Initiator's other choice is to send the first
> message without a KE field, which guarantees a rejection, but the
> rejection will contain the identity of the group the Responder will
> select.
The above described scheme to negotiate DH groups seems complex.
Can the negotiation of DH groups be furthur simplified?
Is the restriction that phase1 negotiation can have only one
proposal still valid? If we loosen that restriction than becomes
to propose multiple DH groups as attributes of different proposals.
>
> Anticipating problems with this negotiation, the Responder MUST check
> that the length of the KE payload corresponds to the size of the
> Diffie-Hellman group the Responder selects and if not, the Responder
> MUST send a Notify with an INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION or IKE-SA-INIT-
> REJECT and indicate the Diffie-Hellman group selected.
>
> In the unlikely event that the Initiator proposes two different
> Diffie-Hellman groups whose KE values are the same size, the
> Responder may not be able to detect the incorrect guess and will
> respond with a KE payload to complete the exchange. The Initiator,
> however, MUST detect this case when examining the Responder's SA
> payload and abort the connection setup. If this occurs during Phase
> 1, the Initiator can simply retry with a new KE value. If it occurs
> during Phase 2, the Initiator MUST delete the SA erroneously
> established and establish a new one.
>
> Implementation Note:
>
> Certain negotiable attributes can have ranges or could have
> multiple acceptable values. These are the Diffie-Hellman group and
> the key length of a variable key length symmetric cipher. To
> further interoperability and to support upgrading endpoints
> independently, implementers of this protocol SHOULD accept values
> which they deem to supply greater security. For instance if a peer
> is configured to accept a certain MODP Diffie-Hellman group and is
> offered a group which has a larger prime modulus an implementation
> should accept this value.
>
>7.4 Key Exchange Payload
>
> The Key Exchange Payload, denoted KE in this memo, is used to
> exchange Diffie-Hellman public numbers as part of a Diffie-Hellman
> key exchange. The Key Exchange Payload consists of the IKE generic
> header followed by the Diffie-Hellman public value itself.
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Key Exchange Data ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 8: Key Exchange Payload Format
>
> A key exchange payload is constructed by copying one's Diffie-Hellman
> public value into the "Key Exchange Data" portion of the payload.
> The length of the Diffie-Hellman public value MUST be equal to the
> length of the prime modulus over which the exponentiation was
> performed, prepending zero bits to the value if necessary.
>
> A key exchange payload is processed by first checking whether the
> length of the key exchange data (the "Payload Length" from the
> generic header minus the size of the generic header) is equal to the
> length of the prime modulus over which the exponentiation was
> performed.
>
>7.5 Identification Payload
>
> The Identification Payload, denoted ID in this memo, allows peers to
> identify themselves to each other. In Phase 1, the ID Payload names
> the identity to be authenticated with the signature. In Phase 2, the
> ID Payload is optional and if present names an identity asserted to
> be responsible for this SA. An example use would be a shared computer
> opening an IKE-SA to a server and asserting the name of its logged in
> user for the Phase 2 SA. If missing, this defaults to the Phase 1
> identity.
>
> NOTE: In IKEv1, two ID payloads were used in each direction in Phase
> 2 to hold Traffic Restriction information for data passing over the
> SA. In IKEv2, this information is carried in Traffic Restriction (TR)
> payloads (see section 7.13).
>
> The Identification Payload consists of the IKE generic header
> followed by identification fields as follows:
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! ID Type ! RESERVED |
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Identification Data ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 9: Identification Payload Format
>
> o ID Type (1 byte) - Specifies the type of Identification being
> used.
>
> o RESERVED - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored.
>
> o Identification Data (variable length) - Value, as indicated by
> the Identification Type. The length of the Identification Data
> is computed from the size in the ID payload header.
>
> The payload type for the Identification Payload is five (5).
>
> The following table lists the assigned values for the Identification
> Type field, followed by a description of the Identification Data
> which follows:
>
> ID Type Value
> ------- -----
> RESERVED 0
>
> ID_IPV4_ADDR 1
>
> A single four (4) byte IPv4 address.
>
> ID_FQDN 2
>
> A fully-qualified domain name string. An example of a
> ID_FQDN is, "lounge.org". The string MUST not contain any
> terminators (e.g. NULL, CR, etc.).
>
> ID_USER_FQDN 3
>
> A fully-qualified username string, An example of a
> ID_USER_FQDN is, "lizard@lounge.org". The string MUST not
> contain any terminators.
>
> ID_IPV6_ADDR 5
>
> A single sixteen (16) byte IPv6 address.
>
> ID_DER_ASN1_DN 9
>
> The binary DER encoding of an ASN.1 X.500 Distinguished Name
> [X.501].
>
> ID_DER_ASN1_GN 10
>
> The binary DER encoding of an ASN.1 X.500 GeneralName
> [X.509].
>
> ID_KEY_ID 11
>
> An opaque byte stream which may be used to pass vendor-
> specific information necessary to do certain proprietary
> forms of identification.
>
>
>
>7.6 Certificate Payload
>
> The Certificate Payload, denoted CERT in this memo, provides a means
> to transport certificates or other certificate-related information
> via IKE. Certificate payloads SHOULD be included in an exchange if
> certificates are available to the sender.
>
> The Certificate Payload is defined as follows:
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Cert Encoding ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ !
> ~ Certificate Data ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 10: Certificate Payload Format
>
> o Certificate Encoding (1 byte) - This field indicates the type
> of certificate or certificate-related information contained
> in the Certificate Data field.
>
> Certificate Encoding Value
> -------------------- -----
> NONE 0
> PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate 1
> PGP Certificate 2
> DNS Signed Key 3
> X.509 Certificate - Signature 4
> X.509 Certificate - Key Exchange 5
> Kerberos Tokens 6
> Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 7
> Authority Revocation List (ARL) 8
> SPKI Certificate 9
> X.509 Certificate - Attribute 10
> RESERVED 11 - 255
>
> o Certificate Data (variable length) - Actual encoding of
> certificate data. The type of certificate is indicated
> by the Certificate Encoding field.
>
> The payload type for the Certificate Payload is six (6).
>
>7.7 Certificate Request Payload
>
> The Certificate Request Payload, denoted CERTREQ in this memo,
> provides a means to request preferred certificates via IKE and can
> appear in the first, second, or third message of Phase 1.
> Certificate Request payloads SHOULD be included in an exchange
> whenever the peer may have multiple certificates, some of which might
> be trusted while others are not. If multiple root CA's are trusted,
> then multiple Certificate Request payloads SHOULD be transmitted.
>
> The Certificate Payload is defined as follows:
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Cert Encoding ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ !
> ~ Certification Authority ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 11: Certificate Request Payload Format
>
> o Certificate Encoding (1 byte) - Contains an encoding of the type
> of certificate requested. Acceptable values are listed in
> section 7.6.
>
> o Certification Authority (variable length) - Contains an encoding
> of an acceptable certification authority for the type of
> certificate requested.
>
> The payload type for the Certificate Request Payload is seven (7).
>
> The Certificate Request Payload is constructed by setting the "Cert
> Encoding" field to be the type of certificate being desired and the
> "Certification Authority" field to a proper encoding of a
> certification authority for the specified certificate. For example,
> for an X.509 certificate this field would contain the Distinguished
> Name encoding of the Issuer Name of an X.509 certification authority
> acceptable to the sender of this payload.
>
Can the above be made a MUST? ie: for X509 certs, certificate authority
field MUST be the Distinguished name? If not what are the other valid
values for this field?
> The Certificate Request Payload is processed by inspecting the "Cert
> Encoding" field to determine whether the processor has any
> certificates of this type. If so the "Certification Authority" field
> is inspected to determine if the processor has any certificates which
> can be validated up to the specified certification authority. This
> can be a chain of certificates. If a certificate exists which
> satisfies the criteria specified in the Certificate Request Payload
> it MUST be sent back to the certificate requestor; if a certificate
> chain exists which goes back to the certification authority specified
> in the request the entire chain MUST be sent back to the certificate
> requestor. If no certificates exist then no further processing is
The above sentence is a confusing. Sending certs is a MUST if they exist.
What if the certs matching the criterion are not available? For example
a sub-ca cert in the cert chain may not be available. Can the requestor
make the assumption that the CERT.REQUEST will always be honored and
get all the necessary peer certs (including sub-CAs) or SHOULD it
make a best effort to get the relevant certificates
> performed-- this is not an error condition of the protocol.
>
>7.8 Signature Payload
>
> The Signature Payload, denoted SIG in this memo, contains data
> generated by a digital signature function and is used for
> authentication purposes.
>
> The Signature Payload is defined as follows:
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Signature Data ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 13: Signature Payload Format
>
> o Signature Data (variable length) - Data that results from
> applying the digital signature function to the ISAKMP message
> and/or state.
>
> The payload type for the Signature Payload is nine (9).
>
> The Signature Payload is constructed by computing a digital signature
> over some exchange specific information and placing the result in the
> "Signature Data" portion of the payload. The payload length is the
> size of the generic header plus the size of the "Signature Data"
> portion of the payload which depends on the specific digital
> signature algorithm being used.
>
> The Signature Payload is processed by extracting the "Signature Data"
> from the payload and verifying it according to the specific digital
> signature algorithm being used. If the signature is not verified a
> NOTIFY Error message of INVALID-SIGNATURE MUST be sent back to the
> peer and the connection closed.
>
>7.9 Nonce Payload
>
> The Nonce Payload, denoted Ni and Nr in this memo for the Initiator's
> and Responder's nonce respectively, contains random data used to
> guarantee liveness during an exchange and protect against replay
> attacks.
>
> The Nonce Payload is defined as follows:
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Nonce Data ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 14: Nonce Payload Format
>
> o Nonce Data (variable length) - Contains the random data generated
> by the transmitting entity.
>
> The payload type for the Nonce Payload is ten (10).
>
> The Nonce Payload is constructed by computing a pseudo-random value
> and copying it into the "Nonce Data" field. The size of a Nonce in
> this memo must be between eight (8) and two-hundred fifty-six (256)
> bytes inclusive.
>
>7.10 Notify Payload
>
> The Notify Payload, denoted NOTIFY in this memo, is used to transmit
> informational data, such as error conditions and state transitions to
> an IKE peer. A Notify Payload may appear in a response message
> (usually specifying why a request was rejected), or in an
> Informational Exchange (to report an error not in an IKE request).
>
> The Notify Payload is defined as follows:
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Domain of Interpretation (DOI) !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Protocol-ID ! SPI Size ! Notify Message Type !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Security Parameter Index (SPI) ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Notification Data ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 15: Notification Payload Format
>
> o Domain of Interpretation (4 bytes) - Identifies the DOI under
> which this notification is taking place. MUST be set to 1.
> Messages with any other value MUST be rejected.
>
> o Protocol-Id (1 byte) - Specifies the protocol about which
> this notification is being sent. For phase 1 notifications,
> this field MUST be zero (0). For phase 2 notifications
> concerning IPsec SAs this field will contain an IPsec
> protocol (either ESP, AH, or IPcomp). For notifications
> for which no protocol ID is relevant, this field MUST be
> sent as zero and MUST be ignored.
>
> o SPI Size (1 byte) - Length in bytes of the SPI as defined by
> the Protocol-Id or zero if no SPI is applicable. For phase 1
> notification concerning the IKE-SA, the SPI Size MUST be zero.
>
> o Notify Message Type (2 bytes) - Specifies the type of
> notification message.
>
> o SPI (variable length) - Security Parameter Index.
>
> o Notification Data (variable length) - Informational or error data
> transmitted in addition to the Notify Message Type. Values for
> this field are message specific, see below.
>
> The payload type for the Notification Payload is eleven (11).
>
>7.10.1 Notify Message Types
>
> Notification information can be error messages specifying why an SA
> could not be established. It can also be status data that a process
> managing an SA database wishes to communicate with a peer process.
> For example, a secure front end or security gateway may use the
> Notify message to synchronize SA communication. The table below
> lists the Notification messages and their corresponding values.
>
Description of notification message values very useful.
Description of some notification types missing.
> NOTIFY MESSAGES - ERROR TYPES Value
> ----------------------------- -----
> INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE 1
>
> Only sent if the payload has the "critical" bit set.
> Notification Data contains the one byte payload type.
>
> DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED 2
>
> Notification Data contains the invalid DOI.
>
> INVALID-COOKIE 4
>
> Indicates an IKE message was received with an unrecognized
> destination cookie. This usually indicates that the
> recipient has rebooted and forgotten the existence of an
> IKE-SA.
>
> INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION 5
>
> Indicates the recipient cannot handle the version of IKE
> specified in the header. The closest version number that the
> recipient can support will be in the reply header.
>
> INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE 7
>
> Notification Data contains the one byte Exchange Type.
>
What about 'INVALID-MINOR-VERSION'? Is it not applicable for IKEV2?
> INVALID-FLAGS 8
>
> Notification Data contains one byte with the unacceptable
> flag bits set.
>
> INVALID-MESSAGE-ID 9
>
> Sent when either an IKE MESSAGE-ID more that ten greater
^^^^
typo
> than the highest acknowledged MESSAGE-ID. This Notify MUST
> NOT be sent in a response; the invalid request MUST NOT be
> acknowledged. Instead, inform the other side by initiating
> an Informational exchange with Notification data containing
> the four byte invalid MESSAGE-ID.
>
> INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID 10
>
> Notification Data contains the one byte invalid protocol ID.
>
> INVALID-SPI 11
>
> MAY be sent in an IKE Informational Exchange when a node
> receives an ESP or AH packet with an invalid SPI. address
> as the source address in the invalid packet. This usually
> indicates a node has rebooted and forgotten an SA. This
> Informational Message is sent outside the context of an
> IKE-SA, and therefore should only be used by the recipient
> as a "hint" that something might be wrong (because it could
> easily be forged).
>
> INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID 12
>
> Notification Data contains the one byte invalid transform
> ID.
>
> ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED 13
>
> The "Notification Data" for this type are the attribute or
> attributes that are not supported.
>
> NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN 14
>
> BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX 15
>
> PAYLOAD-MALFORMED 16
>
> INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION 17
>
> The KE field is the wrong length. This can occur where there
> is no error if the Initiator guesses incorrectly which
> Diffie-Hellman group the Responder will accept.
> Notification data contains the Transform Substructure
> describing the chosen Diffie-Hellman group.
>
> INVALID-ID-INFORMATION 18
>
> INVALID-CERT-ENCODING 19
>
> The "Notification Data" for this type are the "Cert
> Encoding" field from a Certificate Payload or Certificate
> Request Payload.
>
> INVALID-CERTIFICATE 20
>
> The "Notification Data" for this type are the "Certificate
> Data" field from a Certificate Payload.
When is this notification payload expected to be sent?
It is not described in rfc2408 as well.
Should it be treated in the same manner as INVALID-CERT-ENCODING?
>
> CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED 21
>
> This is identical to the INVALID-CERT-ENCODING error.
>
> INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY 22
>
> The "Notification Data" for this type are the "Cert
> Encoding" field from a Certificate Payload or Certificate
> Request Payload.
>
> AUTHENTICATION-FAILED 24
>
> INVALID-SIGNATURE 25
>
> ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION 26
>
> Don't understand.
>
> UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE 29
>
> The "Notification Data" for this type are the Exchange Type
> field from the IKE header.
>
> UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS 30
>
> The "Notification Data" for this type are the entire message
> in which the unequal lengths were observed. Receipt of this
> notify MAY be logged for debugging purposes.
What is the use of the above message? When is it expected to be used?
I have never seen it getting used.
>
> UNSUPPORTED-NOTIFY-TYPE 31
>
> The "Notification Data" for this type is the two byte Notify
> Type that was not supported.
>
> IKE-SA-INIT-REJECT 32
>
> This notification is sent in an IKE-SA-RESPONSE to request
> that the Initiator retry the request with the supplied
> cookie (and optionally the supplied Diffie-Hellman group.
> This is not really an error, but is processed like one in
> that it indicates that the connection request was rejected.
> The Notification Data, if present, contains the Transform
> Substructure describing the chosen Diffie-Hellman group.
>
> INVALID-KE-PAYLOAD 33
>
> This error indicates that the KE payload does not match the
> chosen Diffie-Hellman group. It can occur legitimately in
> either Phase 1 or Phase 2 if the Initiator supports multiple
> Diffie-Hellman groups and incorrectly anticipates which one
> the Responder will choose.
>
> SINGLE-PAIR-REQUIRED 34
>
> This error indicates that a Phase 2 SA request is
> unacceptable because the Responder requires a separate SA
> for each source / destination address pair. The Initiator is
> expected to respond by requesting an SA for only the
> specific traffic he is trying to forward.
>
> RESERVED - Errors 34 - 8191
>
> Private Use - Errors 8192 - 16383
>
>
>
> NOTIFY MESSAGES - STATUS TYPES Value
> ------------------------------ -----
>
> RESERVED 16384 - 24577
>
> INITIAL-CONTACT 24578
>
> This notification indicates that this IKE-SA is the only
> IKE-SA currently active between the authenticated
> identities. It MAY be sent when an IKE-SA is established
> after a crash, and the recipient MAY use this information to
> delete any other IKE-SA's it has to the same authenticated
> identity without waiting for a timeout. This notification
> MUST NOT be sent by an entity that may be replicated (e.g. a
> roaming user's credentials where the user is allowed to
> connect to the corporate firewall from two remote systems at
> the same time).
>
> RESERVED 24578 - 40959
>
> Private Use - STATUS 40960 - 65535
>
>
>7.11 Delete Payload
>
> The Delete Payload, denoted DEL in this memo, contains a protocol-
> specific security association identifier that the sender has removed
> from its security association database and is, therefore, no longer
> valid. Figure 16 shows the format of the Delete Payload. It is
> possible to send multiple SPIs in a Delete payload, however, each SPI
> MUST be for the same protocol. Mixing of Protocol Identifiers MUST
> NOT be performed with the Delete payload. It is permitted, however,
> to include multiple Delete payloads in a single Informational
> Exchange where each Delete payload lists SPIs for a different
> protocol.
>
> Deletion of the IKE-SA is indicated by a Protocol-Id of 0 (IKE) but
> no SPIs. Deletion which is concerned with a Child-SA, such as ESP or
> AH, will contain the Protocol-Id of that protocol (e.g. ESP, AH) and
> the SPI is the receiving entity's SPI(s).
>
> NOTE: What's the deal with IPcomp SAs. This mechanism is probably not
> appropriate for deleting them!!
>
> The Delete Payload is defined as follows:
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Domain of Interpretation (DOI) !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Protocol-Id ! SPI Size ! # of SPIs !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Security Parameter Index(es) (SPI) ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 16: Delete Payload Format
>
> o Domain of Interpretation (4 bytes) - MUST be sent as one (1);
> MUST be treated as an error if any other value is received.
>
> o Protocol-Id (1 byte) - Must be zero for an IKE-SA, [] for
> ESP, [] for AH, and [] for IPcomp.
>
> o SPI Size (1 byte) - Length in bytes of the SPI as defined by
> the Protocol-Id. Zero for IKE (SPI is in message header),
> four for AH and ESP, two for IPcomp.
>
> o # of SPIs (2 bytes) - The number of SPIs contained in the Delete
> payload. The size of each SPI is defined by the SPI Size field.
>
> o Security Parameter Index(es) (variable length) - Identifies the
> specific security association(s) to delete.
> The length of this field is
> determined by the SPI Size and # of SPIs fields.
>
> The payload type for the Delete Payload is twelve (12).
>
>7.12 Vendor ID Payload
>
> The Vendor ID Payload contains a vendor defined constant. The
> constant is used by vendors to identify and recognize remote
> instances of their implementations. This mechanism allows a vendor
> to experiment with new features while maintaining backwards
> compatibility.
>
> The Vendor ID payload is not an announcement from the sender that it
> will send private payload types but rather an announcement of the
> sort of private payloads it is willing to accept. The implementation
> sending the Vendor ID MUST not make any assumptions about private
> payloads that it may send unless a Vendor ID of like stature is
> received as well. Multiple Vendor ID payloads MAY be sent. An
> implementation is NOT REQUIRED to send any Vendor ID payload at all.
>
> A Vendor ID payload may be sent as part of any message. Reception of
> a familiar Vendor ID payload allows an implementation to make use of
> Private USE numbers described throughout this memo-- private
> payloads, private exchanges, private notifications, etc. Unfamiliar
> Vendor ID's MUST be ignored.
>
> Writers of Internet-Drafts who wish to extend this protocol MUST
> define a Vendor ID payload to announce the ability to implement the
> extension in the Internet-Draft. It is expected that Internet-Drafts
> which gain acceptance and are standardized will be given "magic
> numbers" out of the Future Use range by IANA and the requirement to
> use a Vendor ID will go away.
>
> The Vendor ID Payload fields are defined as follows:
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Vendor ID (VID) ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 17: Vendor ID Payload Format
>
> o Vendor ID (variable length) - It is the responsibility of
> the person choosing the Vendor ID to assure its uniqueness
> in spite of the absence of any central registry for IDs.
> Good practice is to include a company name, a person name
> or some such. If you want to show off, you might include
> the latitude and longitude and time where you were when
> you chose the ID and some random input. A message digest
> of a long unique string is preferable to the long unique
> string itself.
>
> The payload type for the Vendor ID Payload is thirteen (13).
>
>
>7.13 Traffic Restriction Payload
>
> The Traffic Restriction Payload, denoted TR in this memo, allows
> peers to identify packet flows for processing by IPsec security
> services. The Traffic Restriction Payload consists of the IKE generic
> header followed by restriction information fields as follows:
>
> 1 2 3
> 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Payload Header !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! Rest. Type !D! RESERVED !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> ! !
> ~ Traffic Restriction Data ~
> ! !
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>
> Figure 9: Traffic Restriction Payload Format
>
> o Restriction Type (1 byte) - Specifies the type of Restriction
> being asserted.
>
> o Direction Bit - If 0, this restriction applies to traffic
> originating at the Initiator of the SA; if 1, this restriction
> applies to traffic originating at the Responder.
>
> o RESERVED - This field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored.
>
> o Restriction Data (variable length) - Value, as indicated by
> the Traffic Restriction Type.
>
> The length of the Traffic Restriction Data is computed from the
> payload length. The Traffic Restriction Data may contain more than
> one of its specified type (e.g. Multiple IPv4 Addresses, Multiple
> IPv6 Address subnets, etc). An implementation MUST be capable of
> generating and accepting SA request with four TR payloads: An address
> type and a protocol type for each of Initiator and Responder. An
> implementation SHOULD be capable of accepting all of the Traffic
> Restriction Types defined below. An implementation MUST return a
> Notify of type SINGLE-PAIR-REQUIRED on receipt of a request for an SA
> with a set of restrictions that it can't handle.
> The payload type for the Identification Payload is five (5).
Can one of the data in the specified id types be zero?
If so it will be useful to the semantic can be specified(to avoid
confusion). Otherwise mandate against the use of zero values.
>
> The following table lists the assigned values for the Traffic
> Restriction Type field and the corresponding Restriction Data.
>
> TR Type Value
> ------- -----
> RESERVED 0
>
> TR_IPV4_ADDR 1
>
> Four (4) byte IPv4 addresses
>
> TR_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET 4
>
> Subnets of IPv4 addresses, each represented by a pair of
> four (4) byte values. The first value is an IPv4 address.
> The second is an IPv4 network mask. Note that ones (1s) in
> the network mask indicate that the corresponding bit in the
> address is fixed, while zeros (0s) indicate a "wildcard"
> bit.
>
> TR_IPV6_ADDR 5
>
> Sixteen (16) byte IPv6 addresses
>
> TR_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET 6
>
> Subnets of IPv6 addresses, each represented by a pair
> sixteen (16) byte values. The first value is an IPv6
> address. The second is an IPv6 network mask. Note that
> ones (1s) in the network mask indicate that the
> corresponding bit in the address is fixed, while zeros (0s)
> indicate a "wildcard" bit.
>
> TR_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE 7
>
> Ranges of IPv4 addresses, each represented by two four (4)
> byte values. The first value is the beginning IPv4 address
> (inclusive) and the second value is the ending IPv4 address
> (inclusive). All addresses falling between the two
> specified addresses are considered to be within the list.
>
> TR_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE 8
>
>
> TR_PROTOCOL_ID 12
>
> A one byte IP protocol ID (usually TCP () or UDP ())
> followed by zero or more pairs of two byte port IDs.
> Traffic is only permitted on the specified protocol using a
> port in one of the ranges bounded by a pair of port IDs (if
> no pairs of port IDs are supplied, all ports are allowed).
>
Can one of the pair of two byte port IDs be zero? If so what
does it mean?
>
>8 Diffie-Hellman Groups
>
> There are 5 groups different Diffie-Hellman groups defined for use in
> IKE. These groups were generated by Richard Schroeppel at the
> University of Arizona. Properties of these primes are described in
> [Orm96].
>
> The strength supplied by group one may not be sufficient for the
> mandatory-to-implement encryption algorithm and is here for historic
> reasons.
>
>8.1 First Group
>
> IKE implementations MAY support a MODP group with the following prime
> and generator. This group is assigned id 1 (one).
>
> The prime is: 2^768 - 2 ^704 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^638 pi] + 149686 }
> Its hexadecimal value is
>
> FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08
> 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B
> 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9
> A63A3620 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
>
> The generator is: 2.
>
>8.2 Second Group
>
> IKE implementations MUST support a MODP group with the following
> prime and generator. This group is assigned id 2 (two).
>
> The prime is 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }.
> Its hexadecimal value is
>
> FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08
> 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B
> 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9
> A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6
> 49286651 ECE65381 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
>
> The generator is 2 (decimal)
>
>8.3 Third Group
>
> IKE implementations SHOULD support a EC2N group with the following
> characteristics. This group is assigned id 3 (three). The curve is
> based on the Galois Field GF[2^155]. The field size is 155. The
> irreducible polynomial for the field is:
> u^155 + u^62 + 1.
> The equation for the elliptic curve is:
> y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b.
>
> Field Size: 155
> Group Prime/Irreducible Polynomial:
> 0x0800000000000000000000004000000000000001
> Group Generator One: 0x7b
> Group Curve A: 0x0
> Group Curve B: 0x07338f
> Group Order: 0x0800000000000000000057db5698537193aef944
>
> The data in the KE payload when using this group is the value x from
> the solution (x,y), the point on the curve chosen by taking the
> randomly chosen secret Ka and computing Ka*P, where * is the
> repetition of the group addition and double operations, P is the
> curve point with x coordinate equal to generator 1 and the y
> coordinate determined from the defining equation. The equation of
> curve is implicitly known by the Group Type and the A and B
> coefficients. There are two possible values for the y coordinate;
> either one can be used successfully (the two parties need not agree
> on the selection).
>
>8.4 Fourth Group
>
> IKE implementations SHOULD support a EC2N group with the following
> characteristics. This group is assigned id 4 (four). The curve is
> based on the Galois Field GF[2^185]. The field size is 185. The
> irreducible polynomial for the field is:
> u^185 + u^69 + 1.
> The equation for the elliptic curve is:
> y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b.
>
> Field Size: 185
> Group Prime/Irreducible Polynomial:
> 0x020000000000000000000000000000200000000000000001
> Group Generator One: 0x18
> Group Curve A: 0x0
> Group Curve B: 0x1ee9
> Group Order: 0x01ffffffffffffffffffffffdbf2f889b73e484175f94ebc
>
> The data in the KE payload when using this group will be identical to
> that as when using Oakley Group 3 (three).
>
>8.5 Fifth Group
>
> IKE implementations SHOULD support a MODP group with the following
> prime and generator. This group is assigned id 5 (five).
>
> The prime is 2^1536 - 2^1472 - 1 + 2^64 * {[2^1406 pi] + 741804}.
> Its hexadecimal value is
>
> FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08
> 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B
> 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9
> A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6
> 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8
> FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D
> 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA237327 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
>
> The generator is 2.
>
>
>9 Security Considerations
>
> Repeated re-keying using Phase 2 without PFS can consume the entropy
> of the Diffie-Hellman shared secret. Implementers should take note of
> this fact and set a limit on Phase 2 Exchanges between
> exponentiations. This memo does not prescribe such a limit.
>
> The strength of a key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange using
> any of the groups defined here depends on the inherent strength of
> the group, the size of the exponent used, and the entropy provided by
> the random number generator used. Due to these inputs it is difficult
> to determine the strength of a key for any of the defined groups. The
> default Diffie-Hellman group (number two) when used with a strong
> random number generator and an exponent no less than 160 bits is
> sufficient to use for 3DES. Groups three through five provide
> greater security. Group one is for historic purposes only and does
> not provide sufficient strength to the required cipher (although it
> is sufficient for use with DES, which is also for historic use only).
> Implementations should make note of these conservative estimates when
> establishing policy and negotiating security parameters.
>
> Note that these limitations are on the Diffie-Hellman groups
> themselves. There is nothing in IKE which prohibits using stronger
> groups nor is there anything which will dilute the strength obtained
> from stronger groups. In fact, the extensible framework of IKE
> encourages the definition of more groups; use of elliptical curve
> groups will greatly increase strength using much smaller numbers.
>
> It is assumed that the Diffie-Hellman exponents in this exchange are
> erased from memory after use. In particular, these exponents must not
> be derived from long-lived secrets like the seed to a pseudo-random
> generator.
>
>10 IANA Considerations
>
> This document contains many "magic numbers" to be maintained by the
> IANA. This section explains the criteria to be used by the IANA to
> assign additional numbers in each of these lists.
>
>10.1 Attribute Classes
>
> Attributes negotiated in this protocol are identified by their class.
> Requests for assignment of new classes must be accompanied by a
> standards-track RFC which describes the use of this attribute.
>
>10.2 Encryption Algorithm Class
>
> Values of the Encryption Algorithm Class define an encryption
> algorithm to use when called for in this document. Requests for
> assignment of new encryption algorithm values must be accompanied by
> a reference to a standards-track or Informational RFC or a reference
> to published cryptographic literature which describes this algorithm.
>
>10.3 Hash Algorithm
>
> Values of the Hash Algorithm Class define a hash algorithm to use
> when called for in this document. Requests for assignment of new hash
> algorithm values must be accompanied by a reference to a standards-
> track or Informational RFC or a reference to published cryptographic
> literature which describes this algorithm. Due to the key derivation
> and key expansion uses of HMAC forms of hash algorithms in IKE,
> requests for assignment of new hash algorithm values must take into
> account the cryptographic properties-- e.g it's resistance to
> collision-- of the hash algorithm itself.
>
>10.4 Group Description and Group Type
>
> Values of the Group Description Class identify a group to use in a
> Diffie-Hellman exchange. Values of the Group Type Class define the
> type of group. Requests for assignment of new groups must be
> accompanied by a reference to a standards-track or Informational RFC
> which describes this group. Requests for assignment of new group
> types must be accompanied by a reference to a standards-track or
> Informational RFC or by a reference to published cryptographic or
> mathematical literature which describes the new type.
>
>10.5 Life Type
>
> Values of the Life Type Class define a type of lifetime to which the
> ISAKMP Security Association applies. Requests for assignment of new
> life types must be accompanied by a detailed description of the units
> of this type and its expiry.
In section 2.4 it was described that in IKEV2 there is no need to
negotiate lifetimes. Does it mean Lifetypes and lifetimes are not
meaningful in IKEV2? If so it should be called out explicitly.
>
>
> ... lines deleted ...
>
>
>
>Appendix A
>
> Attribute Assigned Numbers
>
> Attributes negotiated during phase one use the following definitions.
> Phase two attributes are defined in the applicable DOI specification
> (for example, IPsec attributes are defined in the IPsec DOI), with
> the exception of a group description when Quick Mode includes an
> ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Attribute types can be either
> Basic (B) or Variable-length (V). Encoding of these attributes is
> defined in [MSST98] as Type/Value (Basic) and Type/Length/Value
> (Variable).
>
> Attributes described as basic MUST NOT be encoded as variable.
> Variable length attributes MUST NOT be encoded as basic even if
> their value can fit into two bytes. NOTE: This is a change from
> IKEv1, where increased flexibility may have simplified the composer
> of messages but certainly complicated the parser.
>
> Attribute Classes
>
> class value type
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> Encryption Algorithm 1 B
> Hash Algorithm 2 B
> Authentication Method 3 B
> Group Description 4 B
> Group Type 5 B
> Group Prime/Irreducible Polynomial 6 V
> Group Generator One 7 V
> Group Generator Two 8 V
> Group Curve A 9 V
> Group Curve B 10 V
> Life Type 11 B
> Life Duration 12 V
> Key Length 14 B
> Field Size 15 B
> Group Order 16 V
> Block Size 17 B
>
> values 13, and 18-16383 are reserved to IANA. Values 16384-32767 are
> for private use among mutually consenting parties.
>
Description of some of the Attribute classes are missing.
> - Key Length
>
> When using an Encryption Algorithm that has a variable length key,
> this attribute specifies the key length in bits. (MUST use network
> byte order). This attribute MUST NOT be used when the specified
> Encryption Algorithm uses a fixed length key.
>
> - Field Size
>
> The field size, in bits, of a Diffie-Hellman group.
>
> - Group Order
>
> The group order of an elliptical curve group. Note the length of
> this attribute depends on the field size.
>
> - Block Size
>
> The number of bits per block of a cipher with a variable block
> length.
>
> Additional Exchanges Defined-- XCHG values
>
> Phase 2 32
> Informational 33
>
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>Appendix B: Cryptographic Protection of IKE Data
>
> With the exception of the IKE-SA-INIT-REQUEST, IKE-SA-INIT-RESPONSE,
> and Informational Exchange error notifications when no IKE-SA exists,
> all IKE messages are encrypted and integrity protected. The
> algorithms for encryption and integrity protection are negotiated
> during IKE-SA setup, and the keys are computed as specified in
> section XXX.
>
> The encryption and integrity protection algorithms are the same as
> those available to the ESP protocol, through their application is
> slightly different. Whereas in ESP the header that is integrity
> protected but not encrypted is a total of 8 bytes (SPI+Sequence #),
> in IKE it is the 28 byte IKE Header (see section 6.1).
IKE header is 20 bytes. Are u including the IV also?
Then for ESP should it not be 16 bytes (SPI+Seq # +IV)
>
> All other aspects of cryptographic processing (including IV
> insertion, padding, and key derivation) are as specified in [ESP] and
> its supporting algorithm documents. The Next Header byte in the
> encrypted ESP payload MUST be set to zero.
Does it mean explicit IV to be used as in ESP?
>
> NOTE: This is a change from IKEv1, which along with its companion
> specifications defined its own algorithms for padding, encryption,
> and integrity protection and its own codes for cryptographic
> algorithms. Since most IKE implementations will also include ESP
> implementations, this alternative was thought to simplify both the
> specification and the implementation, as well as limit the number of
> techniques in need of analysis for soundness.
>
> In some circumstances SKEYSEED_e may not be long enough to supply all
> the necessary keying material an algorithm requires. In this case the
> key is derived from feeding the results of the prf into itself,
> concatenating the results and taking the highest necessary bits.
>
> Consider a fictitious cipher AKULA which requires 320 bits of key and
> the prf used to generate SKEYSEED_e only generates 120 bits of
> material. The key for AKULA would be the first 320 bits of Ka where:
>
> Ka = K1 | K2 | K3
>
> and
>
> K1 = prf(SKEYSEED_e, 0)
> K2 = prf(SKEYSEED_e, K1)
> K3 = prf(SKEYSEED_e, K2)
>
> where 0 is represented by a single byte. Each result of the prf
> provides 120 bits of material for a total of 360 bits. AKULA would
> use the first 320 bits of that 360 bit string.
>
> Support for algorithms other than 3DES-CBC is purely optional. Some
> optional algorithms may be subject to intellectual property claims.
>
>Authors' Addresses
>
>Dan Harkins
>
>
>Charlie Kaufman ckaufman@iris.com IBM
>
>
>Radia Perlman radia.perlman@sun.com Sun Microsystems
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>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-ipsec@lists.tislabs.com
> [mailto:owner-ipsec@lists.tislabs.com]On Behalf Of
> dharkins@tibernian.com
> Sent: Saturday, November 17, 2001 11:11 PM
> To: ipsec@lists.tislabs.com
> Subject: IKEv2 (son-of-ike) draft
>
>
> This draft was submitted but hasn't shown up yet in the repository
> (the I-D editor is, no doubt, swamped) so in the interest of giving
> people more time to look at it prior to Salt Lake here's a link:
>
> http://www.lounge.org/draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-00.txt
>
> Please send comments to the list.
>
> Dan.
>
>
References: