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RE: SOI: identity protection and DOS
>>>>> "Andrew" == Andrew Krywaniuk <andrew.krywaniuk@alcatel.com> writes:
>> ...
>> Not true. You only need a authenticated transport for the public
>> key hashes: you don't have to keep them private.
Andrew> I thought about this, but the distinction is mostly moot
Andrew> because there aren't that many circumstances where you can
Andrew> get authentication without secrecy. Maybe if you phoned the
Andrew> person and you thought the phone might be tapped but you
Andrew> could recognize their voice... Other popular key distribution
Andrew> techniques, such as e-mail, finger, websites, voice-mail from
Andrew> an administrator are unlikely to have that property where
Andrew> they are (meaningfully) authenticated but not secret.
You left out a well established public key distribution scheme that
fits the description: the PGP Web of Trust.
There is even a spec for the use of PGP keys with IKE. I remember at
least one implementation (don't know how many more there are). If
people are interested in a scheme that doesn't require the out of band
channel to have privacy (as shared secrets do), allows for self-signed
keys but isn't limited to them, and doesn't have the insistence on
centralization that the X.509 style CA schemes have, wider
implementation of that spec would be an option to consider.
paul
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