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Re: SOI: identity protection and DOS



The 'private channel' is a vague term need to more elaborate.

When we closelylook at these 'secure channel' it is
a functional equivalent version of the IPSec with different media and so
forth.
(such as 'FACE to FACE' is based on the our eye-balls to verify the
authentication
when we trust the peer's face and the hands are our reliable primitive media
to
pass keys around, or the vocal exchange of password through the air (less
secure)...)

Immediately, we see the need to 'encrypt' (or functional equivalent) the
channel for
pre-shareed key passing around.
Clearly, the RSA public keys do not need this.
However, it will require peer mutual authentication/autherization (so is the
pre-shared key).

----- Original Message -----
From: "Richard Guy Briggs" <rgb@conscoop.ottawa.on.ca>
To: "david chen" <ietf_davidchen@hotmail.com>
Cc: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>; "Paul Hoffman / VPNC"
<paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>; <ipsec@lists.tislabs.com>
Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2001 5:02 AM
Subject: Re: SOI: identity protection and DOS


> On Wed, Nov 28, 2001 at 01:46:07AM -0500, david chen wrote:
> > I try to say that
> > if self-signed certs depend on the out-of-band 'secured channel' that
> > is used the same as pre-shared key for its key management,
> > then why not just use pre-shared key? and save the trouble for
> > public/private keys.
> >
> > Don't see the advantage of using 'self-cert' over 'pre-shared' in this
case.
>
> For pre-shared keys, your secure channel *must* be private.  For
> self-cert, your secure channel to verify the key does not depend on
> privacy for security.  This is the whole point of PK.
>
> This seems fairly obvious to me.  ...or am I missing something?
>
> > --- David
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>
> > To: "david chen" <ietf_davidchen@hotmail.com>
> > Cc: "Paul Hoffman / VPNC" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>;
<ipsec@lists.tislabs.com>
> > Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2001 7:39 PM
> > Subject: Re: SOI: identity protection and DOS
> >
> >
> > > In message <OE20dgLXZ3lV3Rr4Ygc00005184@hotmail.com>, "david chen"
writes:
> > > >The very reason to certify a public key is that
> > > > if the key is not 'public' enough than it is subject to MIM attack.
> > > >
> > > >Self-signed cert is subject to MIM attack unless...
> > > >then why we need public/private key.
> > >
> > > You misunderstand.  I'm suggesting that whatever secure channel could
> > > be used to share a symmetric key could be used to share a public key.
> > > If you can't trust that channel, you can't use pre-shared secrets,
> > > either.
> > >
> > > --Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb
> > > Full text of "Firewalls" book now at http://www.wilyhacker.com
> > >
> > >
> > >
>
> slainte mhath, RGB
>
> --
> Richard Guy Briggs           --    ~\                 Auto-Free Ottawa!
Canada
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